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CHAPTER I 
IN'rRODUCTION 
t he w·est and the Eas t, t he new regimes in Eastern European 
countries have ~ton intense dislike of the VIe st ~ At pre sent, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, i n t he daily headlines we read, are 
but obedient tools of the Soviet Union, and their governments , 
democratic 1n name Nhile totalitarian in fact. 
It is regre ttable that t he fate of the peoples in these 
tt1o countries have often been determined by foreign p mvers. At 1 
the same time it should be remembered t hat t heir political 
developments, good or bad, must be rooted in t heir social and 
1. 
economic ground1>1orks . It seems an exaggeration to discredit 
completely the present gover nments in Eastern Europe and to 
blame t he Soviet Union as solely responsible for the causes of 
their deve lopments . In t he post~var \..rorld, most countries 
except the fe-vr big pot-1ers can hardly be called genuinely in· 
dependent as such; if a small state does not belong to t he 
sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, it must .follow the 
steps of the United St ates and Great Britain , and int ernal 
politics becomes closely connected with international relations . 
Neverthe less, t he funda~mental understanding ot the political 
life of a spe cific state can be obtained only by reference to 
its o'tim past , which obliges t he student to look into 1 ts 
yesterday in order to recognize t he origin of forces still 
operative today. 
Poland and Czechoslovakia are generally understood as the 
leading countries behind the ao .... called "Iron Curta.in . u Their 
recent political developments are certainly significant . Here 
an attempt is made to single out the striking political events 
for each of the t\\!0 states beginning t1T1th the First forld 1.'lar , 
t hrough the trying years bet~veen t he wars and the miserable 
period of t he Second Ttlorld Har up to the present era . :That are 
t he general trends of the recent political developments 1n 
Poland and Czechoslovakia? What simi l arities exist between 
them and in what does one government di.ffer from the other? 
~rhat are t he basj.c factors behind these developments? What are 
the characteristics of the new governments in these t 'tvO 
2 . 
countries? Are they really in a social revolut ion or simply 
influenced by the Soviet Union? These i .nteresting problems 
~-rill be treated i n the follm·Jing pages. 
The scope of the discussion is limit~d to internal 
politics . However , since home affairs are intimately related 
to forei n affairs and political developments are indivisible 
from fundamental social and economic developments , not in-
frequently and especially in the concluding chapter, 1nter-
1national and economic problems '"ill be considered. 
3. 
CHAPTER II 
RI~ CENT POLI TICAL DEVELOPMENT I N POLAND 
1 . Trying Years Between the Two Wars 
Poli sh politi ca l history be t vJeen t he t o lii al"'S may be 
divid d into three pe riod.s . '1'he first period i ncludes t he 
seven years of parliament ary government \-Thl ch ended in "1ay 
1926 . The second peri od wa.s Harshal Pilsudsci•s p seudo-
de mo cra tic rul e i;thich l asted tor nine years . The t hird and 
l a st period :as called an era "dicta torship v-;i t hout a dic-
t a tor . 11 l 
A. Parliament ary Government 
~/hen on February 10, 1919 the Cons tituent Se j m met, t here 
'!.·;ere thirteen politica l parties in the new Polish St~te . The 
most important par ties were the following .: 
1) The Na tional Democratic Party (Endeks), led by Dmowak1 , 
\'las a party of t he Polish bourgeois clas s, intensely conser-
va t i ve , strongly Catholic, pro-French, and bttterly anti-
German and anti-Semi tic . 
2) The Polish Socialist Party ( P. P . S. }, originally a 
patriotic and revolutionary party, .ras dominatec1 by the pe rson-
ality of ·1a.rsha l Pilsudski . As soon a .s t he national 
1
·u1111am John Rose, The Rise of Polish Democracy . 1944, 
p . 15? . 
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independence ias achieved, Pilsudski openly abandone<i socialism 
and betrayed revolution; yet he could not affect the bulk of 
t he party . However, a considerable part of ita members, being 
inspired by ten1n to principle of national self.,..determination, 
joined. hands t--11 t h Rosa Luxemburg• s folloi·ters to form the Polish 
Communist Party . 
3 ) The moderate P1ast Party ( P . S . L . ) , led by ivincenty 
··Ti tos , and t he radical Liberation Party , lea. by Stanisla~v 
Thugutt, represented the t"tvo iv1ngs of the Polish peasant move-
ment . 
The Constituent Sejm immediately voted a declaration, known 
as t he " Little Cons titution, " laying down the first constitu-
tional structure Of t he new Polish State and confirming :Pilsude 
as heo.d of the Republic . There was a series of quickly changin 
cabinets bnsed on unstable coali tions ... - chiefly between the 
Peasant Center and either the Nation list Right or the 
Socialist Left . 
On l·~arch 17 , 1921 the formal Constitution t"la.a adopted; 
establishing a system of government largely modeled on that of 
France. The legislature consisted of t he Sejm and the Sena te . 
~rhe Se jm possessed the supreme auth<:)ri ty and ke . t the cabinet 
conetantly re sp onoible to it . 'rhe President 1.·ras more or lea s a. 
figure head . 
I n November 1922 , elections for the f irst Par11ment ':.,.e r e 
held . 1~arutow1cz , one of P1lsudsk1• s friends , Nas elected 
President , a a the Marshal had refused to accept t1e ost. But 
5 . 
befOl"e long he was assassinated; and lojciechol"rslri , o.n old 
member of t e Polish Socia list Party , becarae the net1 President . 
The paralysis of government which was c used by faction in 
the Sejr.1 continued. In 1923 the coalition of the National 
Democrats and the Pia.sts led by ·n toe was so hostile to 
Pilsudsk i as to make him retire from the Government . 
?he Sejm faile d to give t he country security or p~osperity . 
Land reform was delayed by increasing squabbles . The burden of 
deflationary policy inaugurr:;.ted by Grabski fell most heavily on 
the p oor . In 1925 Germany denounced her treaty w1 t h ,:>ola.nd , 
thus creating a serious crisis in the Polish ooa.l industry . In 
11arch 1926 the conclusion of a ne1;1 'R.usso-German treaty in 
Berlin increased the general nervousness . Pilsudski , in his 
retreat, 'to'Ja.s looked up to by large masses of the people as the 
only man \1ho could secure a better future fol" the country . 
B. P1lsudski•s Rule 
In May 1926 , tfhen Hi tos forme d once more a coa.li tion 
Government of the Ri ght and t he Center , Pilsud£lk1 decided to 
act . He marched on Harsai'r \:71th the help of t he army , of his 
vra.rtime "Legionaries" and of the Left, met Nith little 
resistance, overthrew 't1i tos and replaced the J'resident by a 
friend of his own , the seientist J-!osoiolt1 . 'rhe period of 
parl ia.mentarism in Polish hi story t-ras over . 
Once i nstalled, >ilsudsk i sought to increase t he nonparty 
and national char a cter ot his rule by making friends ~.Ji t h t he 
• 
big industrialists and lando ners and the old fami l ies . 'Tith 
the tern orary stabilization of the financial and economi c 
crisis , he v.ranted to t rust his c use against the Sejm to the 
chance of an election. 
In the elections of !.ar ch 1928, his 11 !Jonparty loc 11 t.ron 
135 se ts2 a t the expense of t he Center and the Lef t. 1he new 
Sejm began t..rit . PilsudsLi' s r er.wva.l of the Communi s t deputies 
uhom he accused of creating a disturbance . Since then , the 
Poli oh Comnuni st Party tv-as made illegal and t he ban was never 
lifted uring he t\"renty years of Poli sh 1.ndependence . It ·as 
also the e nd of -rhatever hopes i.iere stil l cheris' ed by the 
Soci a lists that t . eir old a ssociate might govern as they 1oul d 
have h i m govern, and t hereafter the parties of the Left opposed 
him "lithout reserve . 3 
Di s content gre"t.v rapidly. At t he end of the year six 
parties of the Center and the Left decided a merger in opposi-
tion to the Bloc and tabled a mot ion of l a ck of conf i dence. I n 
June 1930 the Cracol'r Congress passed Atr•ong resolutions con-
damning the 't1hole policy of t 1e Government , decidi ng the 
restorat i on of its due right to Parliament , ... nd even aslc ing for 
the r e signa.tion of the r>re sident . · Be ing ~! called for the 
defense of l att < nd libert y, 11 the CraCO't• Congregg marked. out 
the Center ... ef t me rger as the gathering point of opposition 
2r.rhere 1·rere 444 seats in the Sejm . 
3 Kenne t, "Pilsudsk1 11 , The c, mbridge F:istory of Poland 
(169?-1935) . p . 610. 
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forces in case of a coming general e l eetion. 4 
In order to revi se t he Constitution, t he Government dis-
solved t he Sejm. Sudde nl y t he chief le ader s of the Opposition 
I I 
were arrested, i mprisoned at Brzesc and maltre ated. \li tes 
I escaped arrest and took refuge in Czechoslovaki a . The No,rember 
elections were tempe stuous,_ Soei.~,lists and police came to blows 
in the stree tg of 1·Tar saw, and. t here li!'e r e arre sts among t .e 
politicians . By t hese means the Gover nment obtained a strong 
m~. j ori t y in t he Se jm. The ne 1 Se m began to make a reform of 
t he Constitution. 
But t here \'IaS a formal diff iculty ln t he way of changing 
t he Constitution, because the Government's majority in the 
SeJm was less 'C han tha t requir ed fo r t hat purpose by the 
Constitution. On January 26, 1934 , when the Opposition walked 
out of t he Se j m a s a protest against constitutional change, t he 
Gover nment, in t heir absence, coolly passed t he new Constitu-
tion . 
'Jlhe second Constitution gave far greater pot~ers to the 
Executive aml almost deadly v.teakened t he Legisla ture. The 
President was elected by universal suffrage from two candidates, 
,one nominated by t he retiring President, the other, by an 
assembly of ei ghty electors chosen b y the Sejm and the Senate . 
I The President appointed the min:t sters t'll1o praot1oally were 
responsible only to him . Possessing equal pm1ers t~Ti th t he Se jm, 
~ose, 2£· £11. , p . 17?. 
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the Senate 't'Jas partly appointed. by the President and pnrtly 
chosen by a very limited electorate . 
I.ess than three 1..Yeeks afte r the coming into force of the 
ne~ Constitution, on May 12, 1935, t he darshal died t sixty-
five years of age . !e rul d Pol -nd. for ntne years, sometimes 
openly and som times f'taom b,hind the s cenes . Unlike the other 
contem orary d tat rs who always con picuousl concentr .ted 
. 11 po,rEH'S +n t lemsel,reA , -c11 .sudsk1 ooulcl cleverly cone l t his 
concentration. 5 
C. 11 Dictatorshi p it/1 thout A Dictator 11 
Af ter the death of the Marshal t he country as ruled by 
t he "Government of the Colonels ," among t<Thom "Tere Sl ek , t he 
l,ader of the onparty Bloc; · Beck, the Fore ign 1 ini ter; and 
Koc , r 1)re ent_n; t he mo t re a ctionary elem nts i n r a.v r of a 
totalitarian system. 
'I'he au t umn elections rere carried out according to the Nett 
""ranc ise Law·s Hhich :re · c framed to prevent t.he Opposi tion from 
an voice in cho sing candidates in t he Sejm. By ··my ot pro-
test~.ng against all that had .happened and in particular agA.inst 
thes~ Lars, t e ~position announced a boycott. In consequence 
only 45% of the cleotorate ~ent to the polls, as o posed to ?5% 
in 1930. The ne v S jm, numbering only 208 instead·· of 444, con-
tained no Opposition at all . t the end of October 1936, 
5 K nnet , QR· cit ., pp . 603-604. 
Slaw·ek announced. t h, dis solution of t he Honp rty Bloc, declarin 
that as party politics had been abandoned on principle, its 
t1ork t-ras done . 
In addition to t he net · Oonsti tution an the r~e ranchise 
Lmis, th successors of the Marshal established concentration 
camps at Bereza Kartus!ra, kept m.tch ov r the press and took 
measur es to intlmida t e or render he l~;'less outs'taniing ~ . l:ttica.l 
op~ onents . 6 Facing t.he serious t~conomic situation badly bit by 
t he Depression , the Go'lrernment adopted a policy of rig id de-
flati on , -;.,reighing most heavlly on the ~.nd.ustrial uorkers nd on 
t he poor peasants. 
Thus t he G'overnment :r a unable to 11n the sup~ ort. from the 
people . Irrespective of party a..f'filiations , r ore and more 
persons c :;~me to sh w their d1ssatistaet1on . 
, y 1935 the number of tmrkers organized in Trade Unions ha 
reached. e. millie e- nd in 19:36 there lr .. s c series of str~.kes in 
Cracot•T, Lodz .and Upper Sile sia. The leaders of the P .. P . B. 
remained cautious and modera te, but tho r ank nd file of the 
arty became more Y·JillinG to follm.r ex treme line s . It \J a 
doubtless that the illegal Cor.tmunis.t Party we.s gai ning ground. 
, . If 
Early in 1930; after t he Brzesc arrests , the Pi as t and 
Liberation groups had united to form a single Popular Part y . 
Its Young Or gnnization ( t'iici) urged radical reforms E~nd c lled 
for a union of all democratic forces in t he country , 1 ·. e ., a 
6 Rose , Q£• cit., p . 200 . 
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closer collaboration between t he Popular and Social Democratic 
Parties. This corresponded with t he policy of the Popular 
Front advocated from 1935 to 1939 by Moscm-1 and wa s enthusiasti-
cally supported by t he underground Polish Communists. In 
August 193? t he peasants organized a strike in Southern Pol and 
and in some of t he big towns the workers deolared strikes of 
solidari t y. 
On t he other hand, the National Democrats were driving I 
towards t he extreme Ri ght. The young generation of middle clase 
f amilies suffered heavily from the Depression and to t heir 
tra.di tional dislike of t he Jews was nm.,r added an economic 
motive . Thus t hey became a prey to anti-Semitic agita tion and 
straightway moved toward Fascism. In 1934 a group of young 
i 
Fascists split off from the National Democratic Party; in 193? 
t hey united torith other Fascist groups to form the ... a tiona.l 
Radical ( Nara) Party. 
The elections in the autumn of 1938 were held before the 
execution of t he promised electorial reform; thus 65% of the 
electora te took part and the Government secured a better 
majority t han it could otherwise have expected. The real 
public opinion wa s reflected in the municipal elections which 
were comparatively free from pressure and showed a vietory for 
t he Socialists r a t her t han for the National Democrats, the 
Fascists being po~rerless outs ide \varsaw. 
The darkening intern~ horizon did not bring about any 
improvement i n Polish politics, but disclosed t he extreme fool- I 
ishness of the Col onels' Government. I ts aot1on to t ake 
11. 
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w·orld J1 Teschen from Czechoslovakia was unanimously condemned by 
opinion. .As the Naxi campaign for Danzig and the Corridor 
began and the British a.nd French Governments attempted to make 
2. \'lartime Split Bett-reen the Government-In-
F.:xile in London and the National Liberation Committee 
in Lublin; the \'lay Towards Polish Nat i onal Unity , 
·rhe Polish Government 't<Ias forced to leave . its home l and 
on September 18, 1939 . President Moseieki resigned, after 
appointing Viladysla.w Raczk1e't1iez in his plaoe .. General . 
1!/ladyslaw Sikorski, the new Premier and Commander- i n-Chief, 
established his government in Fr ance . When the French Army 
capitulated in June 1940; the British Royal Navy evacuated 
legions of Polish soldiers and the Polish Government moved to 
London . 
Germany• s attack on the Soviet Union made possibl.e the 
reapproachment of Poland and the Soviet Union.. !·fosco.tv ,quickly 
responded to General Si~orski•s proposal; an agreement waa 
signed on July 30, 1941 and diplomatic relations were renewed 
II 
i 
I 
I 
ac cordi ngly . The Sovie t Government promised to assist in t he 
establishment of a Polish Army recruited from t he Sovi t-held 
pr1 soners of mr e;.nd agr eed t o decl are 11 t he Soviet- German 
treaties of 1939 ree;arding territorial changes in Poland as 
ha~tine lost their validity,'' but made no me ntlon of the future 
bon ary be t~men t he t · o countrie s. I ndeed it "as very diff icult 
for t hem tn solve the frontter problem because the Soviet Un.ion 
had annexe d. t he Polt s.h e astern ~ rovince s Hhich t hey claimed a s 
Rye l orussian and Ukrainian territori es originally belonging to 
Russ ia, uhile t he Polish Government, supported by the United 
State s and Great Britain, insisted on the l egitimist rinciple 
of t he fu l l restora tion of t he status quo ante bellum. 
Thus Polish-Soviet r elations l acked a solid basis . As the 
IKatyn inci dent occured, the Sovie t Government declared t he 
break- off of diplomatic r elations with the ?olish Government on 
April 25, 1943 . T1e f act 't\fas t hat on April 12, the German 
radio announced t hat i n Ka t yn a mass grave of 10;000 Polish 
off icers as found. and emphasized that t hese officers 111e re 
ki lled by t he re treating Russic~ns . Immedl (· t eiy, t he Polish 
C1overnmetl t-in- t'!x11e requested t he Inte rnat i onal Red Cross to 
mAke nn on- t he-s . ot investigation of t he German charge . The 
Sovi et Government ac cused the Polish Government of pl aying i nto 
nazi-Germany 's hands by this action . Accoriing t o Ambassador 
Lane, since in 1939 the Soviet Army did ea.pture abou t 10,000 
Polish officers 'vhose \'/hereabouts the Soviet authority f a iled 
to disclose afte r the resumption of Poliah .... Sovie t relations , 
and since he learned in Pol and t hat vrhen the Soviet Army invade 
13. 
olan many Polish officers 1ere r u t hl essly disarmed and mal -
tre t ,d., 1 t seems rea sonable 11 to question seri ously t he 
since r i ty of the outburst of Sovi e t indignation over the · olish 
Gover-nnent 1 s ~:p!)ro c: Oh to I nternation 1 Red Cross . n? In t h is 
connection, ·rofe esor ~ehuman bel i e V'ed t hat Pol is . a d So i e t 
tti tudes rnust be e ually regr -. ttable becau se G·o bbals ' 
. r o·.agand was p!'e is~ly e mpha·ti c on 11 t·redg;e rriving ~ "8 
Tn UC.l 
air_. lane rash on July 4 , t ansla·r Mi Lola jczy c, one o the ble 
leaders of the Peasant Party r.-ra.s appointed Premier .nd. h is fate 
soon clooe ly l inketl 'tv i t h t he Polish- Soviet crisis . 
H1kolajczyk f a ce . a complicatecl sit .ta tion , mi11 t nr .ily and. 
poli t ica l ly . Re l a tion s bet~reen the underground acttvit1es of 
the Poli sh .• orne rrny and t hose of the . ussians t-rere filled "tJi th 
suspicion and :r.ee 1mi nat1on . -. ea.n •r.hile, tl e C mmuni t. de c re 
the e stablt shrnent of a _ a t1ona1 Council in l:Ta.rsaw, t he first 
decree of -:hi ch t~ta s t he p oint ment of a mi l! t ary commander for 
the neople ' s Lrmy . 9 
As the <Jar ·rent on , t he e a.cllock h d to be ended . The 
. oviet Union ' s i ns1.stence on t he ne't' fl''ontier t,r~.s unchan(3'e ble . 
G·rea t B~. t a 1n anr1 the Un1 ted States, anxiously in nee d of 
O'Tie t I!lili t c __ r y coope r a tion, app r en'Gly had no intention 
7~A.rtllur Bliss 
8 rederic L. Schum n , Interna tional Poli tics . 1948, p . 404 
9 tanislaw· !-: ikola jczyk , rrhe HaDe of Poland,~ 1948, pp . 48-49 
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of f1 ghtlncr the ovi·et Union on behalf of Poland . nd fin .lly 
t he ..... estiny of Pol nc as de cided by the B.ig Three a.t Teheran 
in Dec m.ber 194. . Upon his return from the Iranian cap it 1, 
Churchill urged Nikolajczyk to accept the Curzon line e.s -
prerequisite for t he reestablishment of t 1e diplomat ic r ela-
ti on s v1i th t .~.1.e S viet Union :.?.net 1n.t1mated that tor t he terri tor 
lost to her _ ole.nd 't~ould a.e ulre F.:ast Pruss i a. , Danzig and Upper 
Silesie. up to the Oder Rive:r~ 10 r!i kol "jczyk rejeoted t hese 
prop sale categorically and came t o the United. iitates for hel • 
Pre siclent Hoosevel t encou:pagec1 him to re ach on agreement · 1 th 
the Soviet Union . On the way t o Moscm1, Mikolaj c ~yk received 
the ne'lr;rs thAt on July 22 t he Union of Polish Patriots or1g1no.ll 
formed in the Sovle t Union was transf ormed into t he National 
Liberation Committee of Lublin, a t that time the only l arge 
city lib8rated. 
The Lublin Committee ua.s a "uni te (l front" coalition 
comp t)Sed mainly of t he Communists .nd. the left-Hing Socialists. 
The Commtmist leader t·ms Bolesla.; Bierut, a revolutionary 
veteran before the 1.:rar, v-1ho wor1te0. among the Polish pri"' onere 
of ar in th, Soviet Union from 1939 to 1941,. entered. t h 
German .... con·trolled . . o1and clandestlne l y in 1942 1 led an under-
ground movement and. orBanized the Polish 'l:~orrers ' Party \·Ji t h 
rnady s l a,; Gomulka. in 1943 . The trtork:ers' Part y of Po11 eh 
I Soci a lists, led by Edward Osobra- .for a ·rski a.ncl Josef Cyrank1e-r1c 
10 1ayne S. Vucinich , 11 Poland's Fate ! 11 , Cu,rrent History, 
June 1949 , p . 334 ~ 
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a t r ".kow in 194 , in opp or; i tion to the ondon 
ocl n.li Pts ·rho ·through t he ir underground organi zat i on 11 Freedom-
Equality- na er n .ence't ( ~ 1.N) 1·:e re l:1ostile to the Comr:;unist- lecl 
un ergrouncl ,..roup s . 11 fhen th ed Army entered roland , t .. e 
1eft-u 1ng Soci e. 1 sts joine the C ~.:muni sts i n or '~'t.m i zinoo the 
Pol sh 1'at iona.l . ib~ration Comr.1 i ttee .and procl i. !ed t 1emselves 
t e Soci a list P~rty . 
The ubl1n Committee issue ... a manife sto declarinO" t he 
restore' tion of the Polish Constitution of March 17 , 1921 until 
the e. opti on of e. new Cons titution, in ord.er to r.aa.k.e 1 t clear 
that they stood_ in opposition t o th~ Polish 0-ove r nmen t ... 1 n- Ex1le 
-v:h1 ch vras based on t he re otion ry Oonsti t ut1on of 1935. 12 It 
l aunche a t once t he 1 n . r e f orms -vit. ich ha.d been s 1detr eked by 
t he p reu .r r"'g i mes . 
1·1 .,~m 1hile t he roli ah- Sovie t rel ations e n t from b~ t o 
rorse a s t he u. ris i ng of the Poli sh ~orne Army l ed by ""enera.l 
B r - Komoro sk i in 1·!e. rsa.u ·ta.s crushed by t he Ne.zi ~ bee use the 
Rec Ar1 y p os t oneC!. its ~.tt ~.ck on. \fe.rs. t•r ~ma. f a ile e1 t .. er t o 
give millt&ry .!=l.ss i s t ancs t o t he i n sut'gent s or to h l p t he 
.t merican .n· Brltis .. ireraft t o .o so , c1es ite :oscot• ' s d_pe 1 
It o t h e Pol es i n s1 ' .e Ger:.1an- occup i ~ .. Pol and t o r i se to ar 1s . t 
t he en of July an St ali ' s assur nee t Mikol mjezyr on ~ugus t 
v t ha t Sovi et military a i d t o General or ' s f rces Tould be 
lln . ( p seudonym), tt The Fate of Polish Soeia.lism, 11 Foreign 
ffairs . Oct . 1949 , p . 128 . 
l 2u . N., Yearbook on Human Rights for 1947 . 1949, p . 271. 
,,. 
- .. 
eiven . . t ~Josco\".r ?Ukolaj c2~yk met Bierut , s6bka ... J."' ore.ttsk i .nd 
rol . - 7yB1er s· i ~ d l egates fr0m the lillbl i n Commit tee, ~ho son 
ppro e _ of t l e upri s ing c.nd blamec the Polish Government 
f or its f .ilur e . ro t h S vie t au t hority and the Lublin -I 
Comr~li t t ~ prccla l mecl t he t iarsa-r:r u--.rislng t..;as a "p urely oo.V~'> n-
t uri stic , ligh t - m:inde -. ff a1r . 11 t· ccorr11ng to Ar.1b as dor L .ne , 
b y t his act i on t he oviets succee e d defin1 tely i n .i Rci·e di ting 
t . e Po __ l c•h G-overnm'Sn t - 1n-F:x1le nd ~.n bre ak i ng u .. the _ ome Army , 
t he onl: poo ible res:ts t ance to the future c mmrnizat ion of the 
coun try . l3 
In his first trip ~" 1k l aj czyk a chieved nothing . In October 
toge ther Hi th Churchill and F.tlen he 1-Jent to r·Toscow fol .. the 
seconfi. time . Now he Nas fot•mally informed about the Teheren 
decisl n thRt the future Soviet ... Polish frontier shoul be the 
C:urzon line . 14 On October 19 hf:! returned t London . 13eing un-
.ble to c onvince his colle aguea to c.Ccept the Teheren decision, 
re3tgncd the Premiership . r.r1 e nerJ novernmon t was organized 
y Thor:1as r cis ze HL~ i , ::1 member of t he Socia.lj_st Party 1.1hose 
o icy h ad be en id.antif:ted ri t .1 hostility to e.rri. t 1e Soviet 
Tnion . I t s ersi t ent refusal t compromise ~i th t he 8 vlet 
sovernraent [!nd it s i nr e ront 1t/e akne e s be cause of t he nonpa.rti c1-
a tion of Hi :olaj czy.;: 1 s Pe s· n t T'c.rt accelera ted t he Sovie t 
13Lane , QQ. £11., pp . 42- 54 . 
14 ucinich, op . cit ., p . 336 . 
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a tt c\ on it .l5 
The 9(1 Ar y r.:, s 0 v .nc1ng L ,e · er into ol .. nd . n 
De cem e:r. 31 t :. e I .u lin . .. ti onnl t i ber_ tim. Comm1 ttee eel reel 
1 tself to be t h., PolisL Pr vi iOi. al .• o,rernment nd t·•as lm-
me tely recogni z~ by ~ ovi t U. 1 n, 1 t our;l'l t}. e Un_ te 
St ta n Great Bri t in c nt i t ue t . rec gn ze tl n on 
rtovernme nt-in-E .. 1le . On .Janu~.r:r 17, 19~15 
1
'iarsa 1 • ,_ F.l 11ber .. ted . The :Poli sh · o ernmcnt 1 , t ··h tev r 
:!)O'·mr , nd ;.>restig it hA.d. 
On Feb!'uary 11, 1945 '· t Yalta the i g Three d ... cide : 
n u situ tion 11. a be ,n created in -oland as resul 
o:t' t1e 1." complete liberation by t he Hed Army . This ca lls 
for the establishtLnt of . ol:t sh !'ll"Ov!sionc~l G ve nme nt 
Hhic~l c -:.m bt;l 1 or ' roa · 1y baaed .:.-1a 1 1'Tas possible before 
the recent ib ro.tion of th., t1 ., s t ern part of ol .n • The 
_J· rovisional Govern. ont vrhich is nou functioning 5.n Poland 
g~ould tlerefore be reo~ · ro11 zed on a broader democra tic 
~ sis 1-rit... t e inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland 
it lf and from ole s br ad . T 1 s nei' Government s ould 
t hen bG call ed t e ' olish Provisional Government of 
!iB.tiona l Unit • 
I n adtlition, 1 · •·:as declared that the Provisional Government of 
Na tional Unity should hol d ltfree and unfettered elections as 
soon a s .ossible on the basis of u 1versal suffrage and secret 
ballot" ·.nd only the 11 de mocratic and anti-Hazi art1es 11 >;'!ere to 
be permi ted o propose candidates for the elections . The 
Curzon line t11 th minor changes in favor of :Poland uas accep ted 
as t he :fr'ont:ter be t \teen the Soviet Union anCi Poland . In ex .. 
change for• t he territorial losses, Poland "must receive sub-
stantial accessions - 1~ terr•i tol''Y i n the nort h and the ,,_,est 1 at 
lf-Ibid . , pp . 68- 69 . 
the expense of Germany . 
ji 
r 
I 
i 
The Yalta decision was a 1.4"eetern concession to the Soviet / 
Union for the sake of shortening the war . President Roosevelt, 
upon his return to ~1aahingtont told a joint session of the 
/
Congress th t 11 ! am convinced that this agreement on Poland, 
under the ci r cumstances, is the most hopeful agreement possible I 
I for a free, independent and prosperous Polish State . "l6 ~~ 
But its appli cation \'Jas not easy, because in 1ts vtay ther 
,/ stood two di ametrically opposed Polish Politica l groups ~.-1hi ch 
'"ere dominated by mutual fe a r and suspicion and more important- I 
/! /i ly, the one of ~vhich was backed by the Soviet Union 't-~'hile the 
I/' other, by the Uni ted States and Gr eat Britain . 
1 
11lhen t he opening of the San Francisco Conference was 
I I approaching , the Polish Government of National Unity had not 
/ been formed yet . The Soviet Government insisted that the 
existing Provisional q.overnment should. be invited to San 
I 
I 
I 
li 
I 
Francisco and should have the upper hand in the unified govern- / 
ment. On Apri l 21 a Soviet-Polish treaty of mutual allia.nce I 
for t l..;enty ye ars was signed by the Soviet Government and the 
Polish Provisional Government . .At the San Fr ancisco Conference 
Molotov announced that t he sixteen Polish leaders who had met 
for discussion "\<rith Soviet authorities on March 29 were 
arrested on the charge of 11 d1 vereionist s.cti vi ties against the 
16 
.Th!.9.. , p • 84. 
I 
19 . 
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I 
Red Army .n17 Under these circumstances, it was very difficul t 
for the Moscow Commission to fulfil its functions as prescribed 
by t he Yalta decision .l8 
While the activity · of the I...onrlon Government ... in .... Exi1e lias 
greatly curtailed, the \'Tar salt Government was f .. ctually con-
solidated. The executive branch, headed by Osobka- r, ora\-tski as 
Premier~ had stemmed from the early Lublin days . The legisla-
tive branch, known as the National Council of the Home l and 
( KRN) , t· as appointed by the government i n pot1er and t1as direote 
by a Presidium of .seven members headed ·by Bierut.l9 
As a result of Harry Hopkins• last mission to Mosco~ in 
}.fay-June 1945, an agreement on t he list ot Polish leaders to be 
1 i nvited by the l·1osoow Commission was reached, including tour 
representatives of the Polish Provisional Government , tive 
democratic le aders from Poland; and three from abroad . 1~ith 
only one exception all the persons on the list accepted invita-
tions and arrived in Mosco on June 15.20 
.On June 28 t he Provisional Government of Na tional Unity 
was finally formed . It was agreed that the Presidency of t he 
National Council of the 1omeland should be entrusted to Bierut; 
17~., pp. 101-104. 
l8According to the Yalta decision, a three-man commission 
representing the Big Three was constituted in Moscow to super .... 
vise the reorganization of the Polish Provisional Go~ernment. 
19Lane , op. cit., pp . 112-113. 
20Ibid., pp . 115-118. 
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that Osobka- l-1ora -rak1 should be Premier; and that Gomulka and 
Mikolajczyk should be Vice- Premiers . The coal ition ministry 
consi sted of six ministers from the Polish 1orkers' part y 
( PPR ), six from the Polish Sociali s t Party ( PPS , six from 
Mi kolajczyk ' s Peasant Party, t wo from the new Peasant Party (SL 
two from the Democratic Party (SD), and one nonparty ... - the 
Minister of Defe nce . The Communists obtained the strategic 
ministries of Public Secu.rtty, Propaganda , Restituted estern 
21 
'l'erritories, Industry, ~avagation and Foreign Trade . · 
The Governments of t he United States and Great Britain 
simultru1eously recognized the olish Provisional Government of 
National Unity on July 5; and established relations with it . 
On Augus t 16; Polish ... Soviet frontie r was fixed long the 
Curzon line 1ith certai n modifications i n f avor of Poland . 
At the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945), the Big 
Three noted with satisfaction tha t the new Polish Government 
had been organized according to the Yalta decisions nnd it h d 
agreed to hold free and unfettered elections ae soon as 
possible . 
3. Pol.itioal Struggles in the New Era 
A. The Provisional Government of National Unity and 
the Elections of January 194? 
The above- mentioned t1ve parties plus the Christian Labor 
21Ioid. , p . 118. s. Harrison Thomason , 11 The New Poland," 
Foreign Policy Renorts . Dec . 1, 194?, p . 228. 
21 •. 
Party ere the six legal p~ties in the new regime . The 
suppr essed groups continued t o agitate for 1egal1z .tion and 
received support from underground. irregulars 'tvhich were 
strongly anti-.Communist e.nd were denounced by the Government 
a.s 1band1ts1 and "Fascists. 1122 Polish troops abroad., una.er the 
commanu of General Anders , remained a persistent upholder of 
the Polish Government in t .ondon and denounce the Yalta deci-
sion as a betrayal of Poland. • . The Gove:r-nment urged them to 
return to olan as soon as possible, but most of them refused 
to do so , except under certain conditions , including the re-
tention of their arms and guarantees of their personal safety . 
In 1946, General Anders and 75 of .his senior officers, ·Jhil~ 
absent f r om Poland, were sentenced to lose their Polish 
citizenship. This bitter controversy had eep effect on Polish 
pol1tics . 23 
Immediately after his getting back to 1'1 rsa· 1 ~ikolajozyk 
tried but failed to make the net1 Peasant Party merge t'li t h hie 
old :r.>ea.sant Party . Then the name of his party t-ras ch. nged to 
the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) in September 1945 . It 11 sto d 
oppo sed to the smothering ot ~r1vate enterprises ••• and asked 
for friendshi p with the Western Powers as well a s with 
Russ1a, 11 24 receiving t he main support of those hostile to the 
22S1 dney B. Fay 1 '' Poland's Troubled Elections", Current History, March 1947, p . 215 . 
23Lane , .212.· cit ., pp . 124 , 141. 
24ralcola jczyk, .212.• cit., p . 147. 
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netiT r egime. I t ~ras consi der ed by the Gove rnment as a party of 
capitali s ts ~nd reactionaries, composed of l andl or ds and 
property mtTne r s. Ac cor ding to G. D. H. Cole, 
The ext reme y foolish handling by the British Government I 
of t he probl em of ff1nd1ng up t he re aotionru."y Polish Govern 
ment in Lo~ on and of di sbanding the Pol ish Army i n Ital y , 
which under General Anders was definitely a counter-
r evol utionary force, made the Pol ish authoriti es i n 'Jar aw 
mor e t han ever inclined to regar d Nr .• Mi kolajczyk as an 
i nstrument to be used for t heir overthrmt ~K the re-
actionar y forces in London and vlashington. · 
So t he Government put every obstacle in the t<Tay of t he act-
ivitie s of the Polish Peasant Party; according t o l..1:1kola jczyk; 
his party ' s pr e s s was heavily censored , its membere were 
arrested or muroa~ its meetings were broken up an d its offices 
were r a.i d.ed. 26 In f act, a virtual o1v1l war was r aging in 
P.ol and . ~vh t Mi koa jozyk did not mention 1n hie book was t hat 
11 900 Communis t and Sociali s t politicians were killed in the 
year previous b y t he rightist bands, some of whose local 
l eaders wer e doubtless associa ted with the Peasant Party. 11 2? 
As soon as t he new Government was organized, many prewar 
Socialists endeavored to form a Socialist Democratic Party, 
ltrhich t he rr0vernment refused.. Then t hey entered t he Socialist 
Party and a ttempted to alter its r adicalism. I ndeed, t he 
Soc1al is t Party began to resume cont acts t..ri t h t he i nterna tional 
socialist movement, to reconstruct its i nfluence in t he trade 
26G. D. H. Cole, World in Tr ansition. 1949, p . 234. 
26f-11kola jozyk, .Q£.. cit., pp . 145 ... 160. 
2?Howard K. Smith The St ate 
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unions and cooperative s; and to negotia te 1ith the Polish 
Peasan t Part y .28 The danger of t he "united front" between the 
Communist s and the S' cia.list.s l asted to r ovember 1946·, when six 
Communi s t a nd Soci alist l eaders i n theiJ:I v1si t to Mosco~; 
rea ched an agreeme nt t'l.hich provided methods :for combatting the 
Polish "'easant . arty a nd the l'l'Rl· tv1thin t he Socialist :Party and 
for close cooperat ion i n t he coming electorial campa1gn . 29 
Unde r these circumstances , t he elections demanded by the 
Yalta and Potsdam decisions were delayed time after time, 
because the Communists wanted to wait until they had a firm 
grip on the country . 
In April 1946 t he National Council of t he Homeland 
decided , over t he protest of t he opposition parties , a nation-
~ride referendum on J une :30 1 asking the peopl e ·to express t heir 
opinion on t hree questions of t he Government's policy .30 
1 . Ar e you i n favor of t he abolishment of t he Senate ? 
2. Are you for mak1.ng permanent, through the future 
Constitution, the economic system instituted by the 
land reform and nationalization of the basic 
i ndustri es, 11Iith maintenance of the rights of priva te 
enterprise? 
3 . lo-r e you fo r t he Polish t·re s tern frontiers a s fixed on 
the Oder and Neisse? 
On t he eve of the referendum four parties joined in t he 
Government Bloc who wanted to vote "yea" on all three question~ 
28R., ££· cit ., pp . 129-130. 
29 Ib1d . , p . 132. 
301-11. olajczyk, QQ.· cit., p . 161. 
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while the Polish Peasant P rty and the ~hr1st1an Labor arty 
stood in OD,osition. Wnowing that they had no c1ance for 
victory on issues no. 2 and no. 3, the Peasants and the 
Catholics concentrated on the question no. 1 on t he ground t hat 
the elimination of tb.e Senate would be contrary to t he 
Constitution of 1921 and would, in effect, remove a 
valuable brake which might be usecl again~t a Communist ... 
controlled Sejm, or Chamber of Deputies. 0 .L 
he campai gn before t he referendum was marked by much 
violence on both sides. The votes turned out as had generally 
been expe cted: 68~-; of the voters were for the abolition of 
the Sena e; 77;'1 for land ref' orm and nation ali za ti on of the basi 
industries; and 9170 for the. net.,r front1er.32 To the Government, 
the referendum t'las interpreted as a vote of confidence in their 
policies; but the Opposition accused it of frauds , intimidation 
and persecution . 
Secretary Byrnest Stuttgart speech of September 6 , 1946 
that the t'ITeste rn frontier of Poland \...rould awa1 t final delimina-
tion at the peace conference, although a reiteration of the 
Potsdam aecision, resulted in the worsening of American-Polish 
rela tions and the weakening of Mikolajczyk ·• s position. The 
Polish Government; interpreted the policY of the United States 
as pro- G-e rman and a.nt1-.Pol1sh and attacked Mikolajczyk for his 
intimacy 1...ri th the Un1 ted States . Once again over the opp osi-
tion of the , easant Party, the National Council of the .omela.nd 
32
-vla.yne s . Vuc:tnieh, "Pol and's Fate 1!, 11 Current History. 
July 1949 , p . 20 . 
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as sed t 1e e l nctori al J.mr. 33 
On Frvember 13 the 7>reu1dlt , of t 4 e .. \iati ona.l C uncil of 
t he Hone lan o.nnounccd t 1 t1 t elt~ctions to t 1e c onstituent Se j m 
v- ould be h~_c on J nu. .ry 19 , 1947. The elect 11 · 1 cam o.i n uas I 
t he clima.., of . long smd B;!'tte so1 e r eco;cd of political s tru gl e s 
~n .ols. jczyl~ reve e. ed t h.9.t 
!n fe1·1 rem .ining 1veek.s before t he elect!ons more · 
than 100 1 000 members of the Polish Peasant Party were 
arrested . 130 . embers t1ere r.nur erod. 142 of our can i-
dates were kept 1ri prison throughout the entire cam a.i gn 
period. 3A 
; 1veek before t he elections , the names of our candi-
datee in 10 of the 52 electorial districts were stricken 
f r om. the b!~llot . 35 
r.~he . oli sh :Peasnnt Party · as 8.llowed 36 1i tne sse s at 
the slip counting in 5200 laces~36 
The result of voting as t he Government released showed 
t hat the Government or Democratic Bloo wh1oh consisted of the 
Polish Uorkers• Party , t he Polish Socialist Party, t he Peasant 
Party And t.he Democratic Pa..r.ty and presented a joint list of 
candidates obtained 394 sea ts; t he Polish Peasant Party obtaine 
28 seats; t he Christ i an Labor Party obtained 12 seats ; the 
Polish Peasant Party-Ne~ 1berat1on, a new group splitting from 
the PSL, obt ai ned 7 seats; and t he Catholic Progressive Party, 
also a new small body , obtained 3 seats . Of t he 11, 244 , 873 
33Lane, 22· cit ., pp . 260-265. 
35 . . Ioid •. , p . 191. 
26 . 
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valid vot e s (tot 1 vot e s cqst 11, 413,618; t ot al electora t s 
l 2 ,?0l, Or.:o ) 80 . l.c1 '!fTere f or the Bl oc, lfrhile .akol a,jczy' ' , pe.:rty 
nl y 10 .3/<' ' althoug:1. h- clai med t hat h1 s party actu Ll l 
To c mment upon t he el ections a s , t-vhole, Po1-rard K. 
Smith ,;rote : 
~ven i f ruko1ajezyk t s e s timate o:f' h is sup· OY." t '"c s e x-
t::~_gge rate d, a.n;v one acquainted with the Polish people vrould 
~cnm t h, .... t t~1.e , ro-Commun1 st ~rote coul d not ' av., been 
ne arly so l ar ge aa claimed in t he official result . The 
e l c t:to , had clear ly been coolce d after .'ln ol d eqst 
Eur opean recipe . 38 
B. T 1e Net>' Con~t1 tution and t h ::l Forma tion of 
t he Un1 ted Pol_ s:.1 \Jorkel"s' Party 
After t he elections, the Communi sts and the Socialists 
control increased rapidly and the i nfluence ot the Opposition 
corresp ondingly declined. On February 5 Bierut •v1as elected 
President and two dnys later a new Cabinet was formed under 
Cyrankie :o~1oz . Besi des t he I r emiership , the Soci alist rty 
obta ined six minlst 1 -. s.. The Communist Pa r t y reoei ved five 
portfolios , i ncluding the Mini s try of Education in addition to 
t he other key positions it had occupi ed i n the Provisional 
Government . of rational Unity. }.1ore ove r , l t succeeded in p l a e1n 
strong vi ce-mi ni sters in mos t of t hose ministrie s hich ere 
headed by non- Communists . 
37 
.!ltlsi• 1 p • 200 • 
38Smith it 3~o· , !12• ..2...-· ., p . 0 • 
t:,? . 
~·~ i1 l e czy M.s r.emov ._,. t r m pa;r ticip tion i n the overn-
ment . !i s .... ~.r t., 'm "'111 t und ,r h i m; an :li s pre stige i n the 
jm cl i ned r- ~ic ly . Fincll i n fe r of arre s t n 
ju icla l l iqui dvt i on, ~e flPd he count ry ( on October _ r ) , 
foll o .ivd by open denuncL, t i.ons a.s "an ally of for 1-:-·n 1 p_. r i r:d -
1 ste'' an . de r-ivation of :Pol1s!1 e1 tiz.enshi p . Ee t r , v ... 1 '9d by 
way of Ge r mGny , a cross t he Soviet Zone t o e r l in, ~ ~enoe he a s 
flown to L n ·on by the chief of t he oya l Ai :r Force ;_Olice . On 
!I ovember 25 he arrived i n the Uni ted State e t o j oi. t he other 
Eastern Eur an pe ant 1 ders h hve org8~lize t h Iter-
nat1orJ. 1 r easant Uni on in order to r opagate 11 Pe sant 
Democracy" d exp se communism. 
Afte r the flight of ikol . . 1czy1 ... , t he Pol isl'l ?easant arty 
we s controlled by its left-~dn~ group . On F-.~brua . y ? 1 t joined 
th_, Cent r 1 Coordina.tion Commission of the De mocrat ic Parties . 
The l a st of thA legal ~. si t,_on nm;;r moved over _nt o t . e Go"~!ern 
mcnt coal i ti n . 
The el · ot1m s of ·1 anu, .ry 1947 br- ught ,:l.bout s1 t uati.on 
11 .e tha t t\Thich .hr r ev a i led un e r t he ublin Committee . The 
difference l<~aa that bee · use of t he entry of t . e p r ewar So-
ci a list l eaders into the Socia list Party t he rel t ion s be t ween 
the Socia list R.rty and t he "rlorkers t Party became a nc 1 problem 
The Constituent Sejm passed a law on February 19, amending 
certain articles of t he 1921 Conet1tution 1 as t he Provisional 
Consti tution or t he new 11Li ttle Consti tut1on. 11 Article I of 
this cons titutional 1 . says : 
28 . 
Until uo time as t 1e n t> ' Cons ~1 tuti on of t 1e Republic ot 
Pola nd enters into force, t his Constitutional Sejm re-
pres -nt i n - t he s vere i gn aut ority of t h,? li "'.L .opl 
in accordance with the basic principle s of the Const1tut1o 
of 1 -rc!l 1?, l \:12l , t e i1 nif . sto of t he Poll 1 / Dtio a l 
Libe r ation Committee of' July 22, 1944, and t he leg islation 
on 1r-t:lonn.l Comc i ls , s :~ 11 -s i n acoor a c " itl t ':1e 
soo1 al and i nstitutional reforms endorsed by t he people in 
the :!·afer endum of Jun 30 ' 194:6 - - her y make s t' 
fo l lowi ng provie1ons re~a~d1ng -~he orga~i~at1on g~d powers 
f t :1.3 su",r m orga Ol th~ ,-, j UbliO of -"Ol ..... nd . 
. i de b ._1 · e t-ri t h t ' e 1,.0e j r. there ivas lnsti tuted the ~our cil of 
body c0rres ondi ng to the ::'resi .d ium of the eu. reme 
..-ovi t of tile .so i , t Union~ Thus , 
l'he t:·<3 j r.J -r;:m ,., reduced t o li ttlo more tha o. rubber stamp , 
Nith t he f'u ction of appr oving decrees issuad by t he 
Council or · a sing :tntc latfs bills su mi tted ·to 1 t by 
that body.4 
'rhe l a:t.v repr esented a defe a t f or the Socialist s, -rho desi red a 
s trong go·v .rnment as -vrel l as a s t rong legi sla tu1•e . 41 
Shor·uy af t e r t he elections,. t he Communists campai gned 
violently ga i ns t t he Sociali s t-run cooper a t i ve s, a ccusi ng t hem 
of excessive speculat i on and profits i n re t a i l t rade . Gomulka, 
.Secre tar y- Genera_ of the Uor cers ' Pm--ty , i n his .1ay Day spee ch 
urged 11 o:rgn.nic unio of bot h par t ie s into one . 11 The Soci alis t s 
ogr·eed -vri t h the Commun i sts on t he need f or close cooper ation 
1i th the Sovi~t Union, but they regretted complete 11enati on 
of Pola.nd from t he Uni ted Sta.t es and :rest e r n Europe . This 
39Poli eh . e ee aroh and Information Service, Poland , t he 
Pr ovi sional Constituti on of Feb . 20 , 1947 and the . De olt~ration 
of Ri .. ht s . 1947. 
40R 
• f .!212.. eit ., p . 133 • 
41 Jb i (l . 
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Conference . or r:uro::.~c n recov ry in Sune . 
n the f:.ocJ .. f~1ist arty Con .ress r. hi ch pen d on e ember 
1 _, Tioo feld pro _ o~e ,. 11 e at _ ri ~n Merxist platform, . o in 
t 1e.t it mit..:,li. t be , sRibl e t re concile economic o.n . .. soci 1 
revol ution Hit ... !. co si .. r~. e de .ree of civil i erti s. 
rl,he · .ochfelt Platform -ra~ 'l ngcce,, t B.ble to the C mmunists 
and t .. e 1EL t- ~·ri n0 lea e:rs of the noci lints . h~ :tn .. lly , on 
r.~ ~rch ? , 1948 Cyrnn~1e dcz formally declared that his Party ms 
ready to m~n-·g ·it 1 t \'iorkers • Party ~ On March 23 t he Polish 
Soc1alis ... s mnde n f in J .. break H1th the Jestern Soc1 lists. 
~ he C m uni ta a ccep ted Cyrankie~ricz ' s offer 1n :lr1nc1ple, 
but i nsi s ted tha t t h Jocial1 t Party muat first undert ake an I 
extenaive urge of its ran s . 
, en 1hile the Gom1nform resolution against Ti to deep ly 
1 affe cted the Polish Communists . Tt ~·1 s r umored th t JOmulka 
.:1ald n tion· 1· stic vie~rs similar to 1~1 to's; he had defended 
t hese view in t h :3 Cominform s Nell a.s in his mm P rty; and 
he ev ... n h ope d t;o sBe that the Socialists t1ould bring l arge 
number of rightists ~md moderoates i nto t e United Party so as 
to g ive t he nationalistic Polish Communism a broad b~se. 42 
Surpr.isingly on Se tember 5 ·1e l·I~s clisroissed as Se oretary-
G·eneral by the Central Committee f t he \~'orkers 1 Party. 
nresident Bi e!'ut was made t he new Secretary- General in place of 
him . 
p . 140. 
In September 18-:-23 the Chief Council of the Socialist 
I Party held a "purge . session. '1 11 False course 11 and "revisionism11 
such a.s Hochfeld. ' s proposo.l "\'Jere criticized by Cyre.nlt.ie~ricz and 
Ma.tuszEn~ki . Many Socialist veterans i n the 1~R ~ , including 
Kazimierz Puza.k , pret-Iar Secretary ... General of the Socialist 
Party, t-lere brought to tr:t 1. . . / Former premier Osobka-Morawski 
and Governor Piasowsk1 of Lower Silesia Province were removed . 
I 
From December 15 to 21 the Nerger Congress met a t ~Tarsaw . I 
The new party, named the Un:t ted Polish \'lorkers • Party , l1aving 
1.2 million full members and 300 ,000 candidates , 1as domi nated 
by the Communists who obta inecl eight out of the Politiburo's 
eleven members . 43 
Folloldng the fusion of the t lv-o le ading part ies, the 
Government V<Ias reorganized . Almost all important posts, except 
t he p remiership , were t aken over by the Communists. Previously 
they kept 33 out of 60 government off .1ces of the rank of vice-
minister and higher; nmv they oeoup i ad 53 out of 74.44 
43 1.!2!..Si·, p . 141. 
44Ibid., pp . 141-142. 
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CHAPTER !II 
RECE!T POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
1 . Pattern of Political Life in the First Republic 
In the interwar years Czechoslovakia was the only country 
in Eastern Europe where the democratic institutions were 
genuinely maintained. The pattern of the political life in the 
First Republic of Czechoslovakia. may be divided into the 
following three aspects . 
A. The Democratic Constitution 
Early in the proclamation of Czechoslovak independence by 
the National Council in Paris on October 18, 1918, the general 
features of the projected democratic State had briefly and 
definitely summarized -- universal suffrage, minority rights, 
proportional representation, l and and social reforms. All 
these principles were embodied in the Constitution which was 
formulated on February 29, 192o.l 
The Constitution adop ted the parliamentary system. The 
legislative power rested in a bi-cameral Parliament: a Chamber 
of Dep uties consisting of 300 members elected for a six-year 
term, a Senate of 150 members elected for eight years. The 
l see S. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European 
Hi story, 1944, pp . 287-289 . 
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members of Parliament were to be chosen according to the 
principle of proportional representation by recognized 
political parties. In the ~nterim between full sessions of 
Parliament an elective Committee of 24 -- 16 Deputies and 8 
Senators -- wae delegated to exercise plenary Parliamentary 
power, save for a few specifically reserved cases such as 
election of the President or Vice-President, amendment of the 
Constitution, or declaration of war. 
The President was elected by the National Assembly (i.e. 
both chambers meeting in joint session) for a sever-year term. 
The first President \va s eligible for re-election indef1ni tely, 
but other,'l}'ise only one successive re-election \~a.s perm1 tted. 
The President's powers were specifically provided, and what was 
not specified was reserved in the Parliament. 
The Constitution was particularly emphatic 1n the matters 
of guarantees to the National Minorities. 
B. Political Parties 
Since Czechoslovakia•s independence had been preceeded by 
decades of political activities under Hapsburg rule , the party 
allegiances in t his country, based on fundamental, social and 
economi c interests, were hi ghly stabilized for patterns of 
political i deologies. 
The National Demoorat1e Party, led by Dr. Kramar, was 
strongly nationalistic, hostile to the Germans and other 
Na.tional l>11nor1 ties, and opposed to Socialism. 
The National Socialist Party, led by Dr. Benes, was 
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firmly democratic and violently nationalistic, but stood for 
social reforms. 
The Social Democratic Party, led by Tusar; had a strong 
hold on the Czech 1..,orki ng class and a few years later acquired 
a follot..ring also in Slovakia. The Party split in 1920, l hen 
the majority went out and formed the Czechoslovak Communis t 
Party under the leadership of Smera1 . 
The Communists l aunched a general strike and attempted a 
coup d 'etat in De cember 1920, but the attempt was a quick and 
decisive failure. Nevertheless, the Communist Party continued 
a s a political factor and expanded steadly during the l ate 20 's 
thanks to t he able leader Klement GottvJald. Its membership was 
not confined to the industrial workers; for it won considerable 
support among the poor and baokwal"d peasants of Slovakia and 
Rutheni a and it also included Germans and Hungarians. In the 
elections of 1929 the Social Democrats recovered some ground at 
the expense of the Communists, who again increased their 
following in 1935.2 Unlike conditions 1n Poland; the Czech-
oslovak Communists retained their political rights t hroughout 
the history of the First Republic. 
The Czech Agrarian Party t<Jas the dominant party in t he 
political scene of independent Czechoslovakia. Under its wi se 
.J . . 
leader An tonin Svehl$ , it took part in coalition after coali-
tion and attracted various element~ that had little in common 
2Hugh Se ton-~·!atson, E&stern Europe between the 1ilare. 1945 
p . 1 ?3. 
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with the peasant class . They di d defend the interests of t he 
comf ortable f armers of the Czech l ands, but t hey pai d little 
attention to the needs of t he small hol ders of t he eastern 
provinces . Gradually t .he urban capitalists acquired increasing 
influence in t he Party and during the l ast years of the 
Republic , it had t ransformed itself into the principal party 
of capitalis ts . Such highly capi ·talist enterprises as the 
~ , 
Zivnos tenska Banka , the l argest credit institution in t he 
country, layed a decisive part in 1t . 3 
In Slovakia there were two nationalist parties . he 
v , v 
National Party, led by Srobar and Hodza, favore d a strong 
Czechoslovak policy. It soon afterwards merged with the 
Agrarian Party . 
The intransigent autonomi sts formed the Slovak People ' s 
Party with Fat her .lmdret'l1' Hlinka a s its leader. Based on the 
Cat holic prie sthood and rural bougeo1sie , it was strongly anti-
democratic , anti- Semitic and anti~Soo1alist . ~linka never had 
a clear maj ority of the Slovak s behind him ~ but t his does no t 
ne ce ssarily mean that the major! ty of the Slovak s t'lere 
genuinely in favor of a centralist Czechoslovak Republic . "In 
fact, apart from the small and cultured Lutheran minority, most 
Slovaks 11ho voted for the <lernocr atic Czechoslovak par ties we re 
probably opportunist s ~ n4 
3~bid . , pp . 174-175. 
4lb1d.' p . 177. 
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Politicnl ~ administrative and ideological f actors affected ! 
mainly t he Slov ak bourge oi s1e . The f ailure to impl ement the 11 
promise of autonomy (the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918 ), t he 
pre sence of Czech officials and the fear that the Cze choslovak 
St ate t.;ould completely secularize education in Slovakin 't·Jere 
fully expl oi t ed by t he People ' s Party . 
f1e an ,.rhile , the e conomic troubles of t he country mainly 
affected the Sl ovak industrial ~N"orkers and poor peasants . The 
Sl ovak tron and t extile i ndustries t hAnoe t he i-FOrkers must 
earn t heir d ily living could not carry on1 because t hey t-~er•e 
cut off from their original marke t in Hungary . The smal l 
holders e.nd the agl'icultural l andle ss laborers t.;hose int erests 
the Czecho slovak l and reforms had by no means provided for 
ere especi ally harmed by Pr ague's policy of strict agricultural 
protection . The social discontent of t he Slovak working class 
e.nd. pe asantry uere canalizecl partl y by the Communists and 
partly by ~he intransigent autonom1sts . 5 
In Sub-Carpathian Ruthe~ia , the most backward province of I 
t he country , the most influential partie a ~:rere Czechosl ovak 
parties . 
Here, hot'iever, the same must be a a i d a s hl the case of 
Slovakia, t hat this may have been largely due to opportuni 
st considerat ions , and does not prove t hat the maj or ity wa~ 
against autonomy or even positively '·rished f or the surviva 
of the Czechoslovak St ate . 11 6 
5Ibid., pp . 1?8- 179 . 
6Ib1d., p . 182. 
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Poverty a nd pro-Russian feeling made t he Communists the most 
p ol>rerful politica l group . The second 't'.TaS the Agr r1 n Party, 
which even sur passed t he Communist Party i n t he 1929 e l ecttone, 
but fell behind once more i n 1935. The Agrarian Opposition and 
t he Fent.i g Party ~ere t he tHo Ruthenia.n p rtie s; t hey could. 
never compe te 1 th t he tlrJO Oeechoslov~ pa.rtles . 
C. Coalition Government 
In t he pre l imi nary stage of t he net-r Republic . National 
As sembly was set up i n Pr ague, consisting of 256 (later 270) 
Czech e.nd Slovak members chose n by t he executive comm ittee of 
the p rincipal poll tica l pe.rt1e s . This Assembly elected Thomas 
Ge.rrigue 1-1aearyk~ the founder of t he Republic; .. resident and a 
coa lition Government a s formed . 
Early in 1920 the firs t parliamentary elections "tvere eld, 
~h1ch confirmed the supremecy of th~ Sociali sts. But soon 
Tusar's Government ;~as obliged to resign as t he result of the 
split in the Social Democrati c Party. Then came two nonparty 
Governments . By 1922 the i nfluenoe of the Socia list movement 
had. appreciably deolined, and Government 1as henoe forth carrie 
on by party coalitions in t'lhich the increa singly conserv ti ve 
Agr ari ans predominated. From 1922 to 1925 Svehla. ruled ith 
the Soci alists; from 1926 to 19~9 against them. From 1929 to 
1932 an Agrarian- Socialist coalition again held po er .7 
7Ibi d ., pp . 182~185. 
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Thus coalit ion government was the gener~l pattern of 
political life i n the Republic. Not infrequently t he Govern-
ment 1 s majority rrJ s prec riously small ELI'ld the t~.ct and t he 
patience of Pres i dent 1,ias r y t-I e needeo_ to avert rne.ny a 
Parliam~nt crisis . 
en _I 
I t is • mat t er of course that the problem of National 
}..1 1nor i t y affected politics i n Cze choslov kia . The ~1agyars; 
j oyi ng full proportional representation on the floor of 
Parl iament , and being divi ed along par allel politica l lines , 
s teadfastly remained in Opposition. 
rrhe German JUnori t y pal"tie s refused to join t he Pr ague 
Government until 1926 , 1,;hen the Ge r m n gr arians ann Clerica l s 
decidecl to give up their negative attitude toward t he Govern-
ment and ao ept posts in the abinet. !n 1929 the C~rman Socia1 
Democrats , who had already dec i ded on political collabor ati on 
with the Cze cho,lova Social Democrats, also entere t he 
Government . From 1926· to 1935 re l a tions bettveen Czeehs and 
Ge r mans were qu i te satisfactory. 
But Oiling to the sufferings of t he Depression a.n t he 
spectacular success of Hitler , t he 1935 elections ~.;1 tnessed t he 
r ise of a new German party, t he Su etendeut che Partei ( Sd . P.), 
thi ch was founded by a- young gymnastic instructor, Konrad 
Henle in . Surpr i singly it 'frTbn t wo t hirds of t he German votes 
and obta i ned t he second l ar ges t number of sea ts of all parties 
in the r gue Parliament . 8 It v1as able to adopt an increasing 
8Ibid. • 280 . 
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aggressi{e tone . 
Becau se of h i s feeling that a younger hand should be at 
the helrt1 to face the storm H'hich he Sat1l' aj_.proaching, t~asaryk re 
signed t he Presidency in November 1935 . Benes, the co-founder 
of t he .epublic a-d for many yeu~s the Foreign lUniste!' , was 
i mmediately e lect ed by ? a r liamcnt to succeed him . 
The three old G€rman parties continued to coll abor a te with 
Prague , bu'iJ their influence r api dly declined. In February 1937 
these 11 activists 11 and the G-overnment rea ched an ag!"eement by 
't'.rhich t he Governr:1ent promised eubstanti.al eoono nic and cultural 
concessions t o the Germans . 'r_,_!e Sd . :P . denounced this r1 s mere 
tricks and pilloried the 11 acti v i st 't leaders as t r aitors . I n 
t\.pr 11 1938, impressed by the Austrian Anschlusg, many Agrarians 
and Cleri ca lo joined the Sd . P.. Ol1ly the Social Democrats 
an(l the Communists :rema.i necl oppoe.ed to r enlein . 9 
2.. President Benes' 'vfartime Effort a.nd the Emergence 
of t he National Front 
By 1.·37 uhen Czechoslove.k i a lost her fir s t . r es1 1e t . t he 
Ger an danger to the Republic had i ncreased . Henl ,1n 1 s sepa-
ratist movement and Hitler ' s aggressive policy • ..mre clooe ly 
re l a t ed nnd the former 's every act i on ua s on t he latter • "' 
i ns truction. - y t he notoriou s !·1un1Ch Agreement on Sep tember 29 
1938 the :f'our p o111ers dictated to Czechoslovakia that she must 
9 tb1d .. , pp . 281 .... 282 . 
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give up the Sudentenla.nd to Germany . 'l'he cession of half of 
the C2,e ch part. ot' the Te schen area to Poland and of the f'rontie 
regions of Slovak ia td th sub .... Carpathian r:.uthenia. to Hungary ~rae 
a further chapter of' that tragedy . 
Seeing that the Hepublic he had helped create and ma.in'~ain 
~ras dead, Benes resigned the Presidency and soon left the 
Country for• Englz:md. The Gover·nment of General Syrovy ca.rried 
on, with such modifications as the new situation, calling for 
11 collaboration" 1·1i th the Reich, demanded. 'rhe post of Foreign 
1 inister \·Tas filled by Dr . Chvalkovky , ·an Agrarian who pre-
viously h eld ·the post of mini ster at Rome and Berlin, t<;here he 
v-ras suppo sed to have .sympath1e s and some influence . On N'ovembe . 
D 'r't il ·~ r h 1 1 1 • · t 30 , r . 1.rn e h.ac a., an e c~.er y JUl" l. s , t·ms agree d upon for t he 
Presidency ; and Rudolf Beran, also an .;.gr arian, be came Premier, 
taking offioe on December 1 . 
i'h.e Second Czechoslovak Republic waa no longel'• an indepe n-
dent state and 1-1ae accepted by t he people only 'td th the b · tter-
est feeling s . 
The Soviet Pact of 1935 was denounced (October 21). The 
left parties were dief.lolvec1. Al most overnlght office-
holders 1·1ho were known to have been convince.d :t"ollmll'ers 
of t he two founders of the republic were obli~ed to g ive 
up their posts , and 1 t.·1here p ossible; more 11 reliable 11 
nersons 11ere put in their p os1 tions . A gesture of con-
i'ormi ty with t he Nu r nberg ant i-Se mi tic latiS was made . lO 
I·1oreover, the Cze choslovak Parliarnent had t o gr ant the 
demands of the Slovak Catholics lad by r~ronsignor Tiso , Hlinka 1 a 
deputy; for nautonomy . '* Then; acting on orders from Berlin, th 
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Slove.k separ e,tist Parliament procleimed. complete inde endence 
from Prague on May 15, 1939 . The next day Hitler issued a 
d.e cree setting up the 11 Protectora te of Bohemia ... Moravi a!' wi t h a 
Reich Protector (von Neurat ) acting for h im. The R.u thenian 
11 au tonomous" st e.te lria s a lso organized by Nazi agents, and anti-
Semitism, a lso flourished. Thus , t he Czechoslovak nation 
ce ased to live politically. 
As Jan G. Mast::tryk l a ter poin ted out: 
The Czechoslovak nation, r;rhioh accepted the Se cond Republi 
uith the greatest self .... abnegation in the autumn of 19S8 , 
could never be r econciled. l'Ji th the dispensa tion of 1939.11 
I mmediate ly aft r t he Gernan i nvasion into the Cz.ech l ands, 
t he Pre sl ent of t he First nepublio, Dr. Benes, sent identic 1 
p rote Ats to th.e United State s, Gre nt Britain , France, the Sov1e1i 
Union and the Council of the Lene;ue of Nations. This proved an 
incentive for the rising of Czechoslova.k people all over t he 
glo.be e.s lrJell s f or the assemb11n£; and. prepar a tion of Czech-
oslovak mili tary force s. After the outbreak of t he wa.r, Czech-
oslovakia nat urally aligned ltri th t he Allied po'"e:rs. At first, 
a Czechoslova.k r r-lt i onal Commi t tee las set up in :Paris. Follm..r-
1ng the c pitul tion of t he French Army, all the Ozechoslov k 
al:'med forces were tr nsf erred t o Grea t Br1 t ain and. t he .' r ov1-
e1ona.l Czechoslovak Government vms formed in London nt t he 
beginning of 1940 1ith Dr. Bene~ as the President ~~d Dr. Jan 
.} 
Sr me as the he e d of a CP..binet of 12 members including Jan 
11 
' Czechos l oYak1a," 10 'gventful Years . 194?, p . 65. 
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14 sa ryk .s the or i gn ~- i n1Gter. 
.; As e. ~1e sterner, J'r , sident Ben$ s l1 0f'e{ t hat th e lo-
er!c an forces t ul d liber . t . C~ec'oslovak!a or, at 1 st, 
Boh m , i ncl uc'!J.ng Pr~-e;ue . B t t he i ncreasinoo m!li t ary succe s 
of t he Soviet nion , nd the hosti l e a ttitude of t he Soviet 
Union t o .Yc: :rd t he Poli. h Gm.rernmont i n Lon .on con vine d h im 
t hat he muat ea.rn Soviet unders t . nd1ne n.ni'l help . In December 
191!.3 , egainst t he advice of the British Government, he Nent to 
J! o om·r -r c· e he me t St <'.lin .n zec' J.oslovs. ~ Communi t le ~ de r s 
.I:'. con.clu r. a t t-renty-yec r .. llianoe tre tlt~ !i t h t he , ovie t 
Union . 12 
~~ y. r 190_ ritnesaed t he beginnin~ of the 1 b r -ti on 
../ 
f Czec, oe> ov~ J:L ". On :\pril 8 , Ben s · ireCl. conr~r -t l <!ltion t o 
St o.lin on 'G:te vic t ori es 1;·;h oh __ o.<1 br u~ht the Red .. r my to t he 
c ze cho . l ovn bor e r . ne c lle c. on t 1e under ~ ·roun f o ces t 
s i .VI3 a ll - s i bl 0 ( i - t t _ e C.ov1et -~nd Czechoelovak troc s 
a . .f:-'proac~ i ng f rom t he eas t . He decla:r.ec t hat 7•Jhen t he Gove rn-
ment -ras r es to,..ed to the Czec!.1oslovs k soil , he t-J'Culd ftrst of 
a l l E; ~_oct a coa11 tion cabinet of t J.O Se gr oups \· h h.~. t .... ~. . n 
rt · n the s tru<;gl e t home . Le a so assure the Slov ks an 
Ruthen i -ns .... 1 .t all p ! l es 1n t 1e ne~-.r Czec 1osl oVB.l .1 :raul ... 
have e qu 1 r ght s .l3 
12Robert Bruce Lockhart, 11 The Cz chos l ovak Revolution ,tt 
Foreign Affa irs, July 1948, pp . 633- 634 . 
13Frederick L. Schuman , II Czechoslovakia, II The r etv Inter-
nat1onc:.J. Yearhoo}c for 1944 , p . 165 . 
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In Aur-ust , a fll ov ak na tional 1 ~ . berati on move ~; ent b came 
active in out hens t er n Czec~oslovaki a . Pep or t s of vi olen t nd 
eff ectlve ant i - t a?. ~. unde r gr ound 1-mrf er e emt. .. na t ed. fr om . 1 
and hr oadca ste· by t he !oscou r adio . 
An d t he n , i n t he follov ing spring , t he 1ec 1\r•my e n tere d. 
eas t ern Cz.e c hos l ov nkL . and. t Rbl_ shed. cont e.ct 1-ri th t he lov ak 
po rti a:1 ; n. el eE;ation of t .e rrovi s ional C eehoslovak G-over n-
v 
mP-nt in J. ( nc on _n ti tuted it s office s in Uzhororc. an in 
v 
J osica . In Febr uar y 1. 5 · e london G vernment left f or 
" .,.. " c . I o s ice vi a Eo• em·: , uhe ro ,)en s and --ct tl' a l cl , t he om un1 t 
le .<l e l" , had te n day s of intensive ana. se cret cL cu ions • 
. n nol,c ll , r f! pr e ·enta t i vo.s of .,11 group r;r!t c .~. _ a o_ po e 
t he naz i occu:pn.ti on met :tn Kosice , .. n( agree on t he formF~.t1 on 
o_ a c ,,. i ti on CJove!'nm .n t t o carry out f D.r ... re a.ch i n revol -
1'l:'.L1 · r ocuncnt c ecl e.re t 1a t 
i n que stions of .m :.1. ishine; '"' erm ny, repa.r . tion s, deli mita-
tion of f r ontiers and t he orgru1ization of t he future peaoe 
t he C7,e choslovnk GoVt'J'rnmqn t ni s at stanc11ng s oulder to 
shoulder 111 t h the Soviet Union 9.nd 1n line with the other 
Sl cV &n de ocr r tiC count rie s . 
I t aid · oun the pol i cy of a nat ional st te consistinv sole l y 
of Czec_ls and. .,1 vqks on t he e qua l foo ting, -1h ich nece s r·11y 
i nvolve t he e ._ ul s i on of t he bui _ of t hP Cre r Man an un .ar 1an 
minoritles . I t ~ r ovi c\ed f r l a ncl reform a nd the nat1ona l1 za t1o 
Of the COUntry I o l)rin cipa l indUStr ie S. 
14:1\ . G. Be ttany , "Czechos l ovakia bet ·reen Ea st and vleet, 11 
The Ye rbook of '-'lorld Affairs 194?, p . 6?ff. 
on April 6, the Provisional Government of N tional Front 
I 
1/ . 
w·as formed in Koaice, oom .. osing of four Czech parties and t ro 
I j Slovak parties of the Communists, Socialists,. Nationalists and 
I 
Catholics. Zdenek Fierlinger , a Socialist and formerly am-
bassador to r.1osco'l'-r , was named Pr emier . There l!.rere five Vi ce-
! 
' Premiers (one Czech Communist, one Slovrut Communi st, one Czech 
Social D~mocrnt ic , one zech :Oopulcr ""ocialist , and one SlovAk 
Democrat) . ()f t ;qenty ..... t\..ro Cnbinet posts s:t· "t;ere Slovaks . Jan 
•. a.saryk rer:J.~in d :&"'re i gn ~1iniste !3. 1d repre sentecl th... ~public 
a t San Francisco Conference. T e Ministry of Interior went to 
t he Communists . l5 
On ~,. ay 5 Prague t11as 11bere.te an t he ne~1ly unifie 
Government under President Benes moved back to the capi tal . 
3 . The Development of t h, Ne ·; Czechoslovaki a. 
A. National Unity and t he Elections of May 1946 
The outstanding phenomenon of the new Czechoslovaki c.-. a s 
the remarkable degree of unity displayed by the countr y as a 
whole . The Government backed by the Na·tional Front was much 
v 
stronger t han ever befor'e . The Kosioe .Program was carried out 
in a hurry . Sub- Car pat hian .Ru t.hen1 a. trras transferred to t he 
Eoviet Uni on ; 16 Nazi oriminals and l ocal Quislings 1trere 
pr osecuted ; pr act ically all Ger>mans 1tere removed out of the 
country; equality bett-1een t he Czechs a nd Slovalt s was highly 
realized ; an nationali zation decrees iere r a idly 1 plemented. 
15Hans Kohn, "Czechos l ovakia, 11 Britannica Book of the 
Year 1946 , p . 245 . 
l6By ~~ oscm>~ treaty of .. Tune 29 , 1945 . The !:joviet demand 
was on t he ground t hat t he Ruthen1an population is akin to the 
Ukranian s . 
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I 
Cn Ootob~r 28, 1945 t he Czechoslovak "lrovisional Hational 
As sembly chosen y the National Front met . l? I t cons i s te d ot 
300 members , 200 Czechs (120 from Bohemia and 80 from Moravia) 
and 100 Slovaks . The parties represented in the Government 
coalition received equal representation in the Provisional 
National As semb l y , '!JJhich t-ras to be replaced 1 according to 
plans fol .. mulated in t he autumn, by a ne~1 legislature to be 
eleote<l early in t he next year. The Provisional National 
As sembly cnn:t'i ~-:"mec1 President Benes i n office . The Cabinet \"las 
reorgani zed 1'll'i t h ut important change . 
Elections f or the Constituent National ssembly were held 
in conditions of genuine f reedom on Hay 16 1 1946 . The chi ef' 
t a sk of the National J\s sembly was to modify the old t-1asa.ryk 
Constitution or t o adop t t.t ne't·t Constitution 1n its lace. _f 
the 300 se nts i n the Assembly 150 Here assigned to Bohemia , 81 
to t·1oravia an Silesia and 69 to Slovaki a. ; according t o t he 
number of registered voters . In t he elections the Communists 
emerged s t he stronge st single party with 2, 695;915 votes and 
114 se ats ~ The Czech Social Democrats received 36 seats and 
the oorre s_. on<li ne; S1.ova1r Labor Party 3 see.ts . T _us t he 
ve.rious socialist 'artiee re ceived a s.tngl e ma.Jori ty of 153 
sea.ts in t h'3 N tional A.s senbly . Oft e non ... socialist p. rties 
the Czech Na tiona l Socialist Party received 54 seats . The 
Czech Ca tholic People ' s Part y 48, the Slovak Democr· ts 42,. 
and. t he Slovak Freedom Pe.rty 3 se ats . The Communists 
l 7.:.churzia.n , II Cze choslova!..:1a , II The r.e\'1 International Year -
book for 1945 . p . 155 . 
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received 40% of the total vote in Bohemia and Moravia, while 
the conservative Democrats 1r1on 621~ 1n Slovakia..l8 
The I~at ional Assembly gathered in June and unanimously 
.; 
re-elected Dr. Benes President of the Republic. Antonin 
Zapotocki, the Communist President of the Trade Union, was 
chosen Speaker of the Assembly . In the new Cabinet; Communist 
Gottt.rald replaced Social Democratic F1er11nger as the Premier 
and the Communists obtained the most important key ministries . 
In addr~ssing the National Assembly 1 Premier Gottwald called 
for a new Constitution to ratify the nationalization de crees 
which had been adopted on October 24, 1945 and a two-year plan 
aiming at the rai sing of the standard of living to the 1938 
level. The latter became law on October 28 , 1946 and went into 
effect on January 1, 1947. 
B. Struggles \'11 thin the National Front 
The general election of 1946 revealed t hat in Slovakia the 
Communist position wa s not strong, because the Democrats. based 
on the Protestant element, had opened the!r ranks to the 
Catholics so that most Catholic votes were given to them, in-
cluding those persons w.ho had supported the notorious Fascist 
regime of ~4onsignor Tiso and was still e.tt.empt1ng to revive the 
18Kohn, "Czechoslovakia," Britannica. Book of the Year 1947 
p . 246. . . . 
. Schuman, "Czechoslovaltia," The New International Yearbook 
for 1946. p . 174. 
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movement of breaking Slovakia off from the Republic . l9 ,__.-
In February 194? the Slovak Democratic Party he l d a I 
meeting , t he keynote of V¥tl ich 't· a s i nsistanoe on t he pre servatio 
I of a. l a l"ge part of the Slove.k economy under prt vate enterprise $j 
but t h is '\'Jas in direct oppos1 tion to Pr ague' e Two-Year .Plan • 
.I President Benes •.r.rarned the Slovaks of the danger of splitting 
the country . 20 v·/ " 
Soon t he central Gover nment discovered. a series of "plots . 1 
It was asserted that a secret radio station operating from a 
J neighboring country poured a consta nt stream of anti-Czech 
propaganda into Slovakia, that an intrigue to kill President 
Benes was i n the making, that bombs were dispatched through the 
mail to leading Cabinet members, and finally , the most serious 
charge t hat cert a in Slovak armed units modeled on the Hlinka 
Guard, a forme.r fascist organization , were being trained for an 
armed upris.ing , i n \-thich leading members of' the Slovak 
Democratic Party were 1nvolved. 21 
Accordingly , the Communists imposed pressure on the Slovak 
Democratic Party , urging it to purge itself of disloyal 
elements. During the early v-1inter, in an attempt to force the 
resignation of the Slovak autonomous administration -- "Boar d 
19G. E. R. G-edye , "The Forthcoming Struggle for Czeeho-
elovald.a., tt Contemoorar;y Review,. Feb. 1948 . pp . 80-81 . 
20Net'l Yorlt 'l'ime s, Feb. 18 , 194?. 
21walter Stom, The .Peonle's Victory .in Czechoslovakia, 
1948, p . 18. 
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of Trustees" consisting of 15 members, the 6 Communiat Trustees 
resigned but ~-~ere successfully resisted by the Democrats . In I 
the end, however, the Democrats had to yield 3 Trustees, thus 
losing their ma jority in the Board. 
In the summer of 1947 a deva stating drought struck the 
country and it became necessary to find money to subsidize the 
farmers. The Communists proposed a special levy on 0\•Jners of 
property exceeding £ 5 , 000 . This toras b1 tterly opposed by the 
other parties, whereupon the Communists led l oose a vi.olent 
ce.mpaign throughout the country, blaming the ministers \.rho out-
voted their propos 1 as ."reactionary defenders of the million-
aires" and ereati.ng considerable disturbance in the factories 
and the public life of Czechoslovakia. At a critical moment , 
Fierlinger negotiated a separate Commun1st ... Soc1a11st pact which 
reversed the whole situation~ 
However , Fierl1nger 1 s action tvas disapproved by the right-
wing Socia lists. At the subsequent Socialist Conference held 
in Brno on November 161 he vms t hrot n out ot leadership togethe .. 
't<Iith F.rban . Socialist Secretary-General of the Revolutionary 
Trade Union . The right-t\f'1ng put fo~.gard as the Party leader, 
/ Bohumil Lauschman, a 1rse ak man ~·ri thout strong conviction or 
much political sagacity.. Thus the Socialists openly split. 
!n these circumstanoes 1 although it tfas necessary to adopt 
a Constitution, the matter r1as constantly postponed because ot 
disputes on the questions of further nationalization, t he power 
of popular councils, and the status ot Slovakia. The Communist 
position in the Cabinet became weaker owing to the opposition 
48 . 
of the right parties, mai nl y -the a tion .1 so·ciali sts , and the 
spl1 t of t e Social Democrat c. l~eanwhile , mem'bershi p of the 
Communist Part y ·rae increasing stel"'d.i ly. reaching 1,400,000 in 
the beg1nn1nlJ of 1948 . ( 'l'he Communist Party hnd over m11lion
1 
registered members a t t he time of t he general election of 
1946 . 22) I t seemed hi ghly possible t hat t he Oonmuni s ts would 
a pe al to t he masse s t o strengt hen t heir position i n the 
Governmen t uhen an o portuni t~r 'il'as offered. 
c. The Crisis of February 1948 
From the beginning of 1948 , arties of t he a.tional Front 
( already bein~ in friction) were engaged in trying to agree on 
date f or a general election . Before the day was f i xed, the 
crisis came t:hen on February 20 , twelve ministers of t he anti-
Communist parties resigned. 23 
The i mmediate cause was that on February 13 , the c~binet, 
by a small majority , instructed the :t-l1n1 s ter of Interior t o 
revoke a decision of the r ovi ncial Commander of the e curity 
s~rvice fo r t he reorganization of the police in r ague by 
appointing eight Communist Police Chiefs in place of the non-
Communist s , 1·1hich t he ret esting ministers accusen of a 
political maneuver to fasten Communi s t dominance on the l and 
• before t he elections. But the Communist Min~. ster of Interior , 
22 ll219.·, p . 21 . 
23Lockhart , ~· s!l•, p . 639. 
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supported by the Premier and other Communi st and pro· Communist 11 
m1n1sters t refused to a ccep t the instruction on the ground that 
\'Jhat he had done uas strictly in accordance tvith the law, just 
as all other ministers had discretion regar•ding appointment in 
their ministries. 
ln the Cabinet meeting of February 17, Vaolav Stransky , on 
beJ.alf of t lle National Soe1alist ministers, requested a di s-
cussion on the l!ii.nistry of Interior Dispute, while the Premier . 
pointed out that the matter was not on the agend.a and t hat 
No sek , the ).11n1 ster of Interior, ~1as absent because of sic ~ness 
'rhe Premier called them to discuss the nett~ constitution accord-
ing to t he original agenda, but t he National Sociali s ts , 
supported by the People 1 s Party anC:. Slovak Democra.ts , refuse d , 
so he suspended tihe session. An extraordinary meeting t·Tas to 
be called on February 20 . 
In the two days interval the attitude of both sides had 
considerably stiffened . Consequently v1hen the Premie r summ oned 
t he ministers to attend the Cabinet meeting in the usual way , 
the National Socialists sent a letter stating that they would 
only appear if they were informed in advance what reply ·the 
l4 inis ter of Interior would make . r.rhe Premier replied that t h is 
r,.re.s highly irregular and that the statement would only appear 
in the usual way at the meeting. After a. fUl'"ther exchange of 
l etters and negotiations l asting until t he late aftel"noon, t he 
National doo1a1ists tendered their r e signation. An hour la.ter 
came t hose of the People 1 s P8.rty and Slovak Democrats . Since 
5 • 
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---- the Soci2.l Democratic mi nisterH and the ·tt<JO nonparty ministers , I 
Jan Masa.ryk (Hi nist er of Fore i gn Affairs) and Ueneral Svoboda I 
(!Uni ster of Defense) , had not resigned, there were still thir-
tee n mini s ters at their '· ost s. suff icient technically for a 
I quorum . ':'he remaining ministers coul d therefore still function 
legally as a Government . 
The resignation were handed not to the Premier but to t he 
Presiden ·· • According to the Communist i nter preta t i on, by this 
act i on , the protesting ministe J:•s, conne cted t·;rith t he v1e s tern 
pmrers , lHU1ted to crea te t he opportunity to form a governmen t 
t-J i t;hout anc1. against. the fJommuni.s t s , just 'bee -.use t hey 1ere 
agains t tho tvhol e program of nation~-lizati on , land reform and 
· soci ali zat i on for Hhich ·the Communi sts '!tJere the most persistent 
fighters . On the other hond, the partiea in opposition declare 
that they did this be cause,. deeply believing in democracy and 
eivil ·li bert y , t hey would never permit a poliee regim~ . 
. \1 
At firs t ,. Pr esident Benes appeared to have £tood fi r ml y 
and to have refused to accept the resignat i ons , hoping that all 
pax-ties might continue their oollaber ation i n the Government 
until the i mpending general eleotion had manifested the popula.r j 
1dl1 . I 
But t he Communi s ts tnmre determined to act. They r apidly I 
organized vast meetingA in Pr ague, s trikes in such v i tal 
factorie s a s the Skcda :·Iorks a t Pi lsen, and Action Commi ttees 
all over t 1e country , openly declaring t hat never agai n mus t 
1
any of t he re signed ministers hold office. Immedi ate l y , 
All pm.rer -- polioe, army, f actories, shops, offices, 
transportation, press, rad.io, and municipal , regiona l, an 
central government -- was in the hands of the Communis~2 
In Slovakia, t he Democrats were finally removed from the 
National Council and the Board ot Trustees. Through reorgani-
zation the party changed 1ts name to Slovak Socialist Party. 
In t he Social Democratic Party, Fierlinger reasserted his 
leading position by a decision of its Central Executive 
Committee~ Sixteen leaders of the party, including Cabinet 
ministers, members of the National Assembly as well as high 
administrative officers, issued a etatement in which they re ... 
gretted ·the mutual distrust that had a risen between them and 
the Communists as a result of t he rightist influences which had 
lately appeared j.n the party apparatus . The statement em-
pru~ sized that the Social Democrats "tvOuld cooperate with the 
Communists 11 for the realization of a socialist program and for 
the security of the country.n25 Consequently, the hand of the 
Communists vis ... a-vis President Benes was enormously 
streng thened. 
v In the end President Benes yielded and approved a new 
Government in which the Social Democrats servecl wi th the 
Communists, while the other parties, all having been reorganize 
during the crisis, were represented by Communist sympathizers. 
In addition to t he lUniatry of Interior, the Ministry of 
Justice also went to the Communists . The Communist Cabinet 
24Howard K. Smith, The State of Europe. 1949, pp .034-346 
25storm, op . cit.,, p . 43. 
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members increased from nine to thirteen . 
v The ~festern 1-1orld wonderecl Hhy President Benes gave i n 
and l .. ras t:Torried th t t hi s crisis Nould be a second l<!unich . 
According to an inti mately inforfTled e xpert on Czechoslove.kia, 
he t1'n.s oven1helmed by t he lightning speed of Communist 
action, ••• fa11ing health had made hi m i rresolute, and 
he chose t o r emain in office in the hope of exercising a 
moder a te i nf luence on Communist impetuosity rather t han 
risk a c1v1.1 rar tthich he felt -- doubtlessly rightly --
could end in only one way. 26 
To comment upon the thole picture of t he Febr u ry coup , 
John Gunther saidt 
This "'V'as all eomple te l y extre.legal of course . There 
r...ras no bloodshed, at· ever, and no re i s t ance . The legend 
tha·~ the Red Army, t1l'hieh had left Czechoslovakia years 
before , })lsyed. any direct role is completely unfounded. 
In actual f act the ooup 'Vras al most incidental . People 
scarcely ltne•g ~~rhat t-ras goi g on , since the press and. 
radio t'lere controlled. Czechoslovakia lost 1 ts free dom, 
not through a fi ght, but Hi t h a d~ ing s . ueak. The . 
rightist members of t he Government bear considerable 
blame for the proceedings. ' The Communist coup 1 s, in 
f act, a spontaneous and qui ckly organized counterstroke 
to a legitimate but inep t t a ctica l move by t he anti-
Communist ministers.' 'fhe preceding sentence is quoted 
from Sir R bert Br uce Lockh rt • . • 2? 
The ne 1 Government, having received a unanimous vote of 
confidence and. being effeoti vely helpe d by t he Action Comrnitt ees 
which had been announced to be permanent 1nstitutions,28 
26Lockhart , op . cit ., p . 641. 
2?John Gunther , Behind the Curt ain. 1949, p . 221 . 
28Aotion Committees are organized pyramid fashion uith 
Local Action Committees ae the basic units; above them are 
Regional Action Committees, and on t he top t he Central .Action 
Committee of t he National Front . Their decisions are bindi ng 
on political parties as well a s their various organizat ions . 
See Storm , op . c!t . , p . 60 . 
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proceeded to rush through me sures eoializing all industrial 
establishm nts employing more than fifty persons, taking over 
I 
comple te control of wholesale trade, and instituting a series 
of purges 1n public life and in the professions in such a Ttlay 
as t o transf orm the entire basis of Czechoslovak society . 
The only independent politician left in the Government 
.-ra.s Jan Hasaryk , ''-"ho stayed on; declaring that his place w .s 
. v 
with nhis people 11 and l1'1th President Benes . Early 1n La.rch 
(on ll.arch 10) , thr~e days after the Communists celebra ted h is 
f at.1e r•s ninety-eighth bir~hday, trying to mnintain that he 
preached the things whi ch they s·· ood for and to cla i m that 
Masaryk tracli tion as their o rn, Jan Masaryk took his o m life . 
This exceedingly tragic accic1ent shocked the r.vhnle t or l • Most 
of the non- Communists t.rere convinced. that ,{a_sa.ryk ' s sulci e was 
a direct result of the February coup which ha~ uproots the 
foundations of t he type of parli amentary government in which 
he belieyed; some even ~ ent so far as t o charge tha t Lasaryk ' s 
death v-ras a murder . Since Hasa.ryk had the h i ghest reputation 
among his countrymen, the Communist- controlled Government 
ordered a state funeral to mourn his death and at the same 
time offered 1 te o'ltm interpre t e.tion of the accident : a suicide 
under the stress of mental depression due to the bitter 
cr iticisms he had received from hio friends in the United 
St ates and G·re at; Britain because he had joined the ne f Govern-
ment . 
On Nay 9, the Constituent National Assembly unanimously 
adopted a ne't'l Constitution making Czechoslov kia a Pe ople 1 s 
Re ublic . Civil liberties as t<iell as oliti cal social and 
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economic rights were guaranteed, but with t he broad exception 
that " St a tements and acts tha t constitute a threat to the in-
dependence , entirety and unity of the St a te, the r epublican 
form of government and the People ' s Democratic order, are 
punishable a ccording t o l a'<.g . 11 The most important institutions 
are the National Assembly (unicameral), the Presidium (a 
s teerin6 committee of t he National Assembly) and the resident 
of the Republic (elected. by t he Na tional Assembly for a term of j 
7 years). In Slovakia there are';\!a regional government named I 
Bo d of Trustees and a. regional elective assembly; the Board is I 
supposedly responsible partly to the Slovak Assembly and partly 
1 
to t he central Government. 
On Hay 30 , a ne t-s National As sembly was elected on a singl 
list of candidates provided by the Government in accordance 
with an electorial l P..l•T which 1..ras R.dopted on April 4. The l a rge 
majority of the people voted publicly 1n the pre sence of 
elect ion committees rather than in voting booths . The result 
showed an overwhelming vote in favor of the offici al list. 
,J In these crucial days , President Benes ~as being racked 
by his ill-health . On J une 7, he resigned the Presidency after 
r efusing t o si gn the new Cons titution . The ne~ Constitution 
was signed by Premier Gott\•re.l rl and t'lfent i nto effect on June 9 . 
The new P .rliament met on June 10 1 1ith 214 out of 300 
deputies Communists . Klement G-ottwald Has unanimously elected 
President and An tonin Zapotocky beoame the new Premier . In 
t he ne't'l' Cabinet there tvere 12 Communist and 3 Social Democratic 
5o . 
II 
I 
members out of the total of 22 . 29 
Early in April the Social Democrati c Party had decided 
its ol-vn dissolution and unification w'i th the Co nmunist Party , 
when 1 t issued a statemen saying frankly the.t the Social 
Democratic Party should be absorbed Ol"ganiza.t1.onally and 
i deologically i nto the Communlst Party which alone \'lould 
provide t.~.1e organizatione.l ba.sis and the i~eolog:lcal content . 
Perhaps t his was due to pressul"e from the r.ommunists . li.t the 
end of June t he formal fusion was eventually r•e"'.11ze ; lement 
Gott•· a ld became chair an of the combined parties . Thus t et,-
minated ~Ghe 70-year hi story of the Czechoslovak Social 
Democratic Party . 
Dr . Ben s died in °eptembvr ,. t<Vhen the Czechoslovak 
Hepublic he 1ad helpecl build and maint ain was completely 
changed into a state of 11Net1 Democra cy . 11 
291-f lt . K 11 .~ . · er • 1 ory, 
1'lorld. 1949 1 p . 44 . 
.of the 
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CHAPTER IV 
CON CLUSIOl~ 
DECISIVE FACTORS OF HEC~~ ~T POLITICAL DEVELOPME~ TS IN 
POLA1~D AND CZECHOSLOVAKI A . 
The foregoing discussion on the recent political develop-1 
ments in Poland and Czechoslovakia may be summarized as 
follows; In the interwar pe riod, Polish politics was pseudo-
parliamentary , while Czechoslovak politics was genuinely demo-
cratic . In t he second pe riod, from the chaotic war Polish 
unity was realized only t hrough violent political struggles and 
enforced international inta,rferenoes, while Czechoslovak 
_ ational .F'ront w-re.s rather naturally and logically agreed upon 
under the leadership of President Benes. In the t hird and l a st 
period, t he Communist power was established by ruthless means 
1n both countries at a time \·Jhen the over- all mrld situation 
became more and rnore tense . 
Underlying the \'thole development and especially the 
present period are t~ro basic factors . The one is social 
revolution and the other Soviet influence . ':flhese t wo his toric 
forces are intermingled wi t h e ach other, but are of equal im-
portance in eontrolling t he political life in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia . 
1. The Need for Social Revolution 
A. Poland 
57 . 
In Poland, durtng the first few years after the First 
orld Vlar , the ne\'.T bourge ois class appeared to be the strongest 
element , and since a part of it was already engaged i n trade 
and industr·y and the reconstruction o:t' the deva.stated country 
required a large measur•e of 1nd.ustria.liza.tion , ambitious scheme 
of reform \:Jere initiated in the 8e jm. But ivhile partie .s quar-
relled over t hem, l ittle was done to put them into practice . l 
As Poland "<vas a stronghold of big estates, land reform ttras the 
most urgent problem . Indeed, 
But 
Land-reform latrJS were passed in 1919 a.nd 1920 , backed by 
the ideals of those rith a social conscience, the hopes 
of those 1--1ho hungered for• l and, and the fears of those 
"t~ho reasoned tha t if some concessions \V'ere not made , the 
peasants might take a leaf out of the Book of Revol ution. ,
1 as soon as the danger of Soviet Challenge had been overcome 
the ·~hird land-reform l aw, pa.ssed in 1925 , erased. some of 
the provi s1ons of the earlier lators and contained enough 
loopholes so t hat the la.ndot•mera were satisfied t ha.t the 
situ tion uas no l onger 11 dangerous . 11 3 
The Pl ast Party, representing t he interests of the 11 kula.k 11 
cla ss, pai d little attention to the needs of the poor pe a sants. 
It was an irony that an exceedingl y liberal Constitution ex-
isted side by side with exceedingly dishonest and unscrupulous 
Government. 
After 1926 1 t he great landowners obtained more i nfluence, 
1Hugh Se ton- \la tson; Eastern Eurone Between the l1are. 1945 
p . 127. 
2t'lill1am Cary, Pol e,nd Struggle Forward . 1949 , p . 119. 
3 I b i d. . 
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and political trends moved more t01r ards reaction . l'lhile most 
industries 1JTere dominated by foreign capital. infant indepen-
1 dent enterprise had to give way to bureaucratic industry . r.rhe 
Government increased their control over cartels and took over 
comple tely a number of industries, particularly those connected 
with munitions production . Land reforms we re stop~ ed until 
the last years bofore 1939, wnen it was again treated by the 
)'.11nlster of Agriculture Pon1atm1ski . Bet~cveen 1921 to 1937, 
however, only 2; 500, 000 hectares had been divided up , a com-
par tively small amount in the country as l arge as Poland and 
possessi g so many vast estates . 4 
As to the labor policy, some measures to 1mpl"ove the con-
ditions of the industrial t orkers :'l'emained on paper . Among the 
. unskilled l aborers . Trade Unions rlhich 1'11ere closely connected 
with the Social Democratic Party, prospered only in the skilled 
j trades . 0 
4yn Poland. in 1921 64. 77; of holdings were under 5 
hectares e.nd possessed 15 . 35~ of the l and; 34. :3% vrere bet~·reen 5 
and 50 hactares and possessed 31 . 8%; and 11 were over 50 
hactares and possessed 52.9f . Later figures show the same 
proportion of holdings in each category but deliberately con-
ceal t he roportion of land possessed by each. See Seton-
1,~ tson, QQ.• e~t . , p. 86. 
5~. , pp . 136- 137 . 
'?his was t he bare reality beneath t he pseudo- democratic 
surface of Polish politics . Elections were seldom more t han 
a farce . In t he mind of t he unprivilegea. ·,classes -- the ma sses 
of small and landless pea.sants and unskilled wor ker s -- all 
parties and all poli ti cians were a l1l(e ; all were dishone st , and 
all were ·to repress and to exploit them .. 
As t he Depression deepened , social discontent grew. Dis-
illusioned by ·the old parties, t he peopl e l ooked for new men. 
Extremi st movement of Lett and Ri ght gained ground . Observing 
t he rising tide of misery and 1atred, the r uling class bepame 
more and more frightened of their own people . ICVe:t:'y pr ote st 
was a sign of "Bolshevism11 and 'tvaa met with brutal repression . 
The Communi sts ha<l gone underground since 1928 . -e ing an 
illegal ·--,arty , t eir basi c i deas -- social jus tire an revolu-
tion -- undoubtedly appealed t o a l a rge number of wor ers and 
peasants and a considerable number of Aducated midcl.le cla s s 
pe ople as 1r;ell, although anti-Russian feeling Nas aui te str ong 
in Poland . 
B. Czechoslova.lc1a 
Czechoslovakia in the interwar years was t 1e only demo-
cratic country i n Eastern l~urope a ccording to the ·fe s t ern point 
of view. Czechoslovaki a differed from Poland i n t hat she was 
able to preserve t he democratic system until the end. This t1as 
due t o ber hi gher industr1ali~ation and advanced agriculture 
(the indus trial and agr1r1an skill of t he German minority was 
60 . 
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r ma r labl ), er grea ter) os erity, and her liberal and 
humanitari an tr di tion (as personified by th President-
Li berator ,ho 1 s 
z choslov r. incustry ras firmly establi she alre dy by I 
II 
t 1e beg inning of he r indepe!1.denoe and o ntinue t o o·.rm-1 cur ing 1 
t he follo · L1g t uonty ye rs . Tl erefore,. there ~v s a stron .,. 
bourge ois_e 1 •-r~ :l c.h . the commerci a l , intellectu 1 an bureau-
cratic ele . e n·~s were well balanced. These condi t1ons allc ·red 
the achi '3vement of some true progressive meas ures. 
In t he f:lrst place , the Land ?,efo:rm Act on · pril 16, 1919 
provi"ed fo r t he e xpr opria tion and redistribution of all a r able 
l and in es t .tes f over 1~0 he ctare s and l !l.ncl o:f ~my other 
c a tegory i n estP..tes e xce ding 250 he cte.res , i ndemnafi c tion 
being base on t lle aii e re.ge value be t "'ieen 1913- 1 '7 . The tota l 
rea aff cted was 926,817 1ectares . 7 Thi s a s only very 
modera.te reform ~ and t he Land Off i ce move(l slmi/'ly in executing 
1 t and not infrequently made further provisions e.llm·r1ng ex-
e pti ons from e :r.propr1a.t1on . Consequently i n Czechoslovaki a 
t here "' sa substantial number of l cr ge hol ding s, although 
small e.nd medium holdings 't'rere t he most common. 8 
6 Ibid., p . 184 . 
7r ana Kohn, "Czechoslovakia '', Encyclonedi a Eri tann1ca, 
1948, VI . p . 954 . 
8 In Czechoslovakia in 1931, 71% of hol ding s were under 5 
hectares and possessed 23% of the l and; 27~ were bet een 5 and 
30 hectares and possessed 51%; and 2% were over 30 he ctares and 
possessed 26~~ . See Seton- Watson, !m.· cit ., • 87 . 
I 
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In the second p lace , t he cooperative movement was h i ghly 
encouraged. !n the t't o decades fo l loT·Jing 1919 the membersh i p 
of. cooperatives increased many fo l d . By 1938, over 11/~ of the 
total · o~u.ation (i . e . , over 1/3 of the agricultural population 
bel ongec t< at least one of the 1?, 021 cooper a tives of all 
. a 
sorts in t he country . <,;; Undoubtedly suc.J. a :.ride spr ead. movement 
hr.». i mportant political effects . 
In t e third lEl.oe , the a ttitude of t he G·over nment tovard 
labor 1/Ja.S liberal . One of the first lmv-s passed by t he 
National Assembly after the Land Refor m uas the eight-.hour day . 
l!1 t hi n , very s 1ort period legislation was adopted provi ding 
numerou s i tems of social insurance . lO Trade Uni ons , composed 
m i nly of killed l abor ers a nd closely connected witl t he 
Social emocrats 1 p layed an effect:lve p~i\l"t i n politica l life 
until the d.estruct1on of t he Hepubli c . 
l'fitll these progre ss ive achievement s, e conomic conditions 
and accordi ngly , political atmosphere of Czechoslovakia were 
much better than th se of Pol and . t:~ut thi s does not mean th t 
Czechoslova .ia had no social pr oblem during the 1nter- r r 
period . The dev l opment in the we stern part of the coun try ahd 
that i n the eas t ern part ~ ere uneven , thus bringing about the 
danger ous p oli t1ce.l differences. There was the fundament a l 
Q 
'"'S . Har rison Thomson, Czechoslovaki a in Eur opean History. 
1944, p . 297. 
10Ibid . 1 p . 296 . 
conflict bett-Ieen t he ruline; bourgeois class on the one han nd 
t he p oor ·rorke r s e.n pe,. sante on t he othe~ , especially in t he 
1 ::."'evi nce s of 1 va!t la an ·i_ nu ·~ 1enic. . Hh:lle the grarian } arty 
e r _ually name under the control of t h e urb2n bour oisie a nd 
t 1L Soci·-l i sts ot infre C!_ v.G:J.tly \-Jere in zool terr,1S ·ri th t he 
1\ .•ra.x•ians , the Communists steadily recruited t .1 ir · nfluence 
f r om t~.,e I.o· er classe s i n urb n as ' ell a s in rural are .,. • 
Prom t he ab ve anal ysis of the socio-poli tical conditions 
of ol ond n zechoslove.kia in the period betv1een the t wo wars 
we may come to t . e conclusion th .t in these years Pol and had a 
regime s o r cti 0n~ ry th=t t he internal s i tua tion i nevitably 
t-rould be orne l .. evolu tiona.ry i f the norma.l f .nctlonine of ao..min1s 
tration an police ·houl be . Gru, . te <l ; in Cze c 1oslov ki , l 
emocra tic and liber~l, fund ental although t he Gn · ernment Nas 
social and eco1omic .. robl ms e~isted alon.gsid.e l·i t h .':1nori t 
I problems , and if t here rere a destruc t ive or a revolutionary 
force fi rst invadi ng fro'- t he outside , old or e r e once over-
t urned -·!ould hardly be restorec • 
2 . Social Revolution in Action 
!n h istory l ar ,;)e sc .. le 1 .rB have al~·my s given 1m_ etus to 
revolutions . This formula i s e.spe cial l y true for the Second 
,·torld 11ar , •hich had created a. set of mate rial and p sycho-
l og icCl.l c ond i t ions favoring change. Si nce thei r TJhol e life has 
complete l y shattered because of the Nazi inva sion and occupa-
t i on , l arge sections o.f the p opula ti on in Poland and 
Czechoslovaki a as t"lell .?..s their neighboring countries are de-
siring not to go back to the feudal-capitalist or the liber al-
capitalist pattern and are longing for something new. 
A. Poland 
. The fourth partition of Poland ~;" .s a tragedy for the 
Polish pe ople not only becaus of their temporary ordeal, but 
even more so beoause their national reviva l would become 
exceedingly difficult to be realized. On the one hand, the 
Government-in~~xile , .ersisting on the tr d1tional nationalism 
and representing the i ntere sts ot the w·ell ... to-do class, fought 
agains t the Germans as well as the Russ i ans during 1939-1941 
and continued to be hi ghly suspicious of the intentions of the 
Soviet Union after 1941 1 hoping that the old order ~ould be 
reestablished a.s soon as the ·ar v.rould come to an end. 
On the other hand, during 1939-1941, many or the 
Communist leade rs did not resist either the nermans or the 
P.ussians, but left the country for the Sovie t Union . As soon 
as t he Soviet Union vms attacked by Clermany , t hey returned to 
their home l and and inspired an anti- Nazi underground movement. J 
Because t hey ~ere t horoughly trai ned and eff icient, t heir in-
fluence increased rapidly . And mdng to geographic proximity • 
the liberation of Poland t.,as accomplished by the Soviet troops . 
Thus in the formation ot the net'l Poland, the Communists and 
t heir al11es , vii th the support of the Soviet Union , were much 
stronger t han t he Govel"·nment .... 1n-~xile in London , even though 
64. 
..i.he new· r g i me started l and ref r m , .rl i n 19 _4, i rn-
media el., af te r v ... 1e liberation of eas t er i'olan<l . ccord1ng to 
t he Land e or n e cree of Sep tember 6 , 1944, 1 n orig inall y 
o1tmed by t he s·tate , by G .... r mans , or by criml n l e~ ag· in t t h _, 
nat ion ms mar:te l1 out for r e d i stri bution; al so r •v t~ e t , .. te s 
of over 50 h , c tare s wen". 1 ~11 .e u_ • -Y t he en f 1946 t he 
l a d reform was al mos t compl e ted.ll 
The.nk s t o th~ l an(i reform, f arm cre<l i t, t he abolition of 
r a.t l oninc; a t tl e end of 194? a nd t e co ... o ... '"' syste .! 1 • e .l=le..n t life 
has been remarke.bly i m .. rove c,_ £>.nd enri ched.12 
Farru 1 bor has been cons i ders.bly reduced, ""- result of 
the s 1if't of f'ront i ersl 3 and. p _e.nne d. e conomy . .1. hL "me ns 
t hat Polanc t ode.y is a v1nble econ .. mic uni ty, an before i t wa e 
not; t here is no I a r e-.1 possi b:.l l ty of conque r ing rur al un-
employme nt . n14 
It 1."' rJ.ore s:lgnificant that t he socialization of 
11cary, .9J2.· c1t ., p . 120 . 
12-:ovrard K. Smith, The State of Eurone. 1949, pp . 333-33 
13 y H r ch 1946 , more t han 6 1 000,000 Germane in the 11 Regained terri t;oryu had been uprooted and depor t ed i nt o t he 
Soviet and Bri tish Zones of Germany and even the remaining 
2 , 000 , 000 we r e a:t1ai ting transfer ·to <Je r many, accord1ns to the 
s t tement of Iol aki , Minister f or t he Regained Territories and 
Deputy Minister for Hepatriation and Settlement . See Fi dney B. 
Fay , " Poland ' s Troubled El e ctions, 11 .. current History. Maroh 
194?, p . 213 . . . 
14Doreen llarriner• , . '1Economic Changes in Eastern Europ e 
Since t h f:} i·1a r," Interna tional Affairs. April 1949, p . 164. 
agriculture has been decided .l5 The pattern for the new 
measure appears to be the producers ' cooperative, a half- way 
house between collective and individual farming. Communists 
call such a process t he voluntary socialization . 
In January 1946, three categories of private industry 
were nationalized : 1) industries previously m.-med by Germans 
(\V"ithout compensation), 2) essential industries and services 
( with Compensation) , and 3) industries employing more than 50 
employees per shift ( t-vith compensation). These three measures 
t-Jere aiming at speeding the t4ork of reconstruction on the basis 
of a over-all plan . 
'l1ogether with the de~ree for the nationalization of 
industries , the Government issued another decree , "About 
Supporting Private Initiative in Industry and Commerce." 
Accord.ing to Hilnary lUnc, lUnister of Industry , as a result of 
nationalization, 60% of those employed in industry would still 
continue to ~1ork for private industry, and the state enterprise 
t·Jould employ only 40%. 16 Cooperative and private enterprises 
"'ere allmved to develop. 
'l'he outstanding success of the post"t-var Polish Government 
was the rebu.ilding of Warsa't'l, the moat devastated city during 
the \'l::lr and the most savage ruin ever made by the hand of evil 
15New York Times . July 14, 1948. 
16 samuel L. Shar p, Nationalization of Key Industries in 
Eastern Europe. 1946, p . 35 . 
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mankind any l'lhere . 11 The decision to rebuild 1>/arsal.<~ and eep it 
the capital no matter what cost, 11 said John Gunther , 11 \ias of 
course wise in that it· gave a patriotic focus and an urgent 
aggressive fai t h to the workings of the new regime.nl7 
The Polish Three.-Year Plan started in 1947, ai ming at the 
restoration of i ndustrial production to the level of 1939, both 
in the ne1.11 territories acquired from Germany and in the terri-
tories of prewar Poland. And 
Since the new territories meant a larger acquisi tion of 
new industrial capacity, recovery to the pre1a.r levels 
~-rould mean that total industrial production of Poland in 
its present territories would be some 50% higher than the 
industrial production of Poland within its former 
frontiers.l8 
The plan, according to Howard K. Smith, 
was all but completed in 1948. For a country so badly 
crushed, the 1948 production figures in key industries 
are staggering : coal production was 178% of prewar , 
electric power 187%, steel 118%, production of freight 
cars 2,183%!19 
In interpre_ting these figures, however , it must be taken 
into a ccount tha t the production of the formerly German part of 
Upper Silesi.a as ell as of such cities as Danzig, Breslau and 
Stettin, vlhose industrial and mining facilities \vere taken over 
by the Polish administration, is included in the above figures. 
The Polish Government are now preparing a Six- Year Pl an to 
17John Gunther, Behind the Curtain . 1949, p . 252. · 
18 1arriner, QQ. ill·, p . 159. 
19smith, .QQ. cit., pp . 334- 335 . 
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double the industrial production bettveen 1950 and 1956. 
B. Czechoslovakia 
Although the social problem of pret.rar Cze choslovakia was 
not so sharp as that of Poland, the economic li:f'e of the 
Czechoslovak people has been changed by the war to a no smaller 
degree . Hence the Government of National Front must be di s-
tinct from the coalitions in the First Republic. The Agrarian 
Party has disappeared , because its record and especially the 
record of 1 ts leaders t;vas not sui table to the revolutionary 
trend of postwar Czechoslovakia. 'fhe le:f't .. wing parties, 
mainly the Communist Party l>Thich before the rr1ar was ah ays ex-
cluded from office, have now emerged as the leading forces in 
Czechoslovak politics . 
As has been pointed out, the Government of National Front 
~ 
was based on the Kosice Program, which, among other things, in-
cluded the expulsion of the Germans , land reform and national-
ization of industries . These l..rere undoubtedly reflections of 
the people ' s demand. 
After Hunich and after G-e rman occupation, no Czechoslovak 
people -uould aclmi t the Sudeten Ge rmans to equal oi tizenship 
after the war . So the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans w·as 
oa:rried out by the Government in a harsh and revengeful spirit, 
far from the 11 orderly and humane manner" demanded by the 
Potsdam provisions .. By :rt.ay 194? , some 3; 250,000 Germans had 
68 • . 
I a l ready left t he Sudeten l ana . 20 The loss of skilled l abor 
mi ght affect Czeohoslova.k i ndustry, but t he author1 ty seemed 
believe t hat Czechoslovak 1:mrkers from other arta of t e 
to 
country •1'ould repl ace the e:r-m~ms from no1~the rn an l·1es tern 
Boh er.aic !')nd t ha t scores of thousands of Czeohoslov k ~· orkers in 
foreign countries would return home as soon as they kno1 t hat 
tv-ork a -1aits them in tho new na tional state . 
Land t.'l1ich had bf~en o ·med by Ge r mans and collabol"'e.tors 
·mr e conf1scatecl wi t hout compensat ion 1mmed1ute1y af ter 11 be r a-
tion. 1:11 t hi n t o years 1; 700,-000 he ctares of land -rere distri-
buted to 170,000 f amilie s of l andless or poor peasants . I n 
February 1948 , t he Government announced t he splitt ing u of' all 
estates of over 50 hectares and the reform t1TRS done at once . 21 
" On October 24, 1945 , President Banes signed five decrees 
nationalizing all mines and l ar ge industr ial enter pr1 se s 1 
commercial banks and insurance companies. roperties of enemy 
nationals and native collabora t ors were confiscated . All 
others, including :f'oretgn concerns, :qere pai d for in Government 
bonds. .Pr e s i dent Benes declared that 11 the ma jority of the 
people are • • • oonvinced that the past must disa pear" and there 
was a general tendency towar d political and economic changes 
in all of Europe indicating 11 a transition from pure liberalism 
to a system in which the socialist elements 11111 have 
20current .History . July 1947; p .. 51. 
21 A Ibid . , pril 1948, p . 248. 
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considerable 1 V"e ight or even preclomina.noe • 11 Hence, the 
Pre aiden t lvent on.. it was safe:!:' to be fore sighted and adop t a. 
"wise and progressive policy" rat her than be forced into in-
evitable soci&l and economic changes by !!strikes, revolts and 
conflic ts , or even by a civil v1a.r . n22 
Broad as the scope of the nationalization decrees was , 
they did not a.f J?e.ct cooperatives and those i ndustries exempted 
by the Government . 
The Cze choslovak T'W'o- Year Plan ( 1947-1948), like the 
Polish Three ... Year Plan, a i med at ·the raising of the standard 
of living to the prelvar level ~41th a. special emphasis on the 
expans i on of industry in Slovakia t-rhere the economic develop-
ment i s far below that of the we stern half of t he Republic . 23 
Owing t o the shortage of skilled labor a s a result of 
t he eXpulsion of more thal1 three million Sudeten Ger mans, t he 
l ack of materials, the failure of the 1947 harves t and t he huge 
grain sh i pments to the Soviet Union , Czechoslovak economy in 
1948, a s r ef l ected in the extreme shortage of consumer goods., 
a ch ieved only a very moderate industrial recovery . 
HOivever, since the beginning of 1949, t he internal 
economic situation of Czechoslovakia has i mproved 11 not 
dramatica lly but sufficiently to be noticed by the ca sual 
22shar p , ~· c~t., p. 31·32. 
23·~,o a.rriner, op . cit., p . 160~ 
?0. 
shop er 11 and 11 even by those o;ho are politically most host ile 
to the Communis t regime . 11 The N~ 1 York Times reported that 
To be sure , former independent businessmen, shop 
m·mers and professional men and large farm owners --
11 together perhaps 20f; of the population -- have con-
tinued to lose ground economically and will undoubtedly 
lose mory until their identity as a middle class has bee 
d.e strayed. 
But the rest of the population has gained ' in some 
respects including the follot~ing: 
.ationed gooda are in larger and more varie supply; 
prices of the unrationed "free market" have been nearly 
halved; bread and flour products, gasoline, most shoes , 
some soap and some meat have been derationed; rationed 
clot hes have been reduo~~ in price and are being re-
leased more generously . 
From another article we get the same impression. 
If Czechoslovakia 's material conditions continue to 
i mprove at the rate a.t which they have improved in the 
last year , the country will be more prosperous at the 
end of five years than any country in \iestern Europe . 
Unemployment is practically non-existent; production and 
t he real vmge s of the i ndustrial worker are above the 
prewar level ; after being one of t he worst-fed countries 
in Europe a. year ago Czechoslovakia. is tode.y one of' t he 
better-fed. 25 
To carry out the Five- Year Plan trthich aims at increasing 
industri a l oapaci ty by 5056 bet~veen 1949 and 1953, the Govern-
ment has introduced the 11 shock 'tiJ'orker11 system. This, similar 
to the Soviet 11 Stakhanovism, 11 is based on the principle that 
the 11 rich" are 11 those who ~-rork most . " Rudolf Slansky, 
Secretary- General of the Communist Party, has warned his party 
that no new members except shook workers may be admi tted, and 
24Ne ·1 York Times. February 12 , 1950. 
1. 25Alexander fe~th, "Czechoslovakia Revisited," The Nation. 
1January ?, 1950, p , 7. · 
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it is gene r ally bc; lieved. t hat any ~ror•ker 1-rho refuses to join a 
shock brigade will be expelled from ·the party. This system, 
according to a critical observer, has had t ltO undesirable 
results . It has led t o i ncreased absenteeism and to an 
abnormally hi gh r a te of employment changea. 26 
1:lhile the Czecho slovak leaders have use d socialized 
methods i n i ndus t rial enterpri se s, so far t hey have not intro. 
duced collect ivo farming , l-rhich seems too radical to assure t he 
peasants' acceptance . The emphasis in rural area is still on 
the greatly increased use of agricultural machines rather t han 
on collectivization. 2? 
In evaluating t he general economi c developr.nent in 
Eas tern ~urope , an authority pointed out that not only the r a te 
of reconstruction was fast, but the recovery of production had 
been achieved ithout i nflation and with some rises in real 
~ a.ges.28 One of The a tion' s correspondents said more 
definitely : 
Af ter nearly a mont h in Czechoslovakia I am more 
convinced that nine-tenths of our professional anti-
Communist propagandists, i ncluding- some on the Voice of 
America and a .small number on the BBC, are barking up t he 
wrong tree. Hunger , rivations, shortage of food and 
consumer goods -- t hese are precisely t he things hich 
are .!l.Q.! i nherent i n the Communist regimes of t he 11 new 
democracies~"- · By anc1 l arge the opposite condit i ons eldst. 2 
26The Christian Saienoe Honitor. Js.nuary 27, 1950. 
27v1erth , .Qll· cit., p . 8. 
2B1arr1ner, £2· £1l., p . 161. 
29·,,lerth, .91l• cit. , p . 7. 
Thus the economic recovery and development a s a remarkable 
result of social revolution in Poland and Czechoslovaki a cannot 
be discredi tecl, a. l though t he other side· of the picture is seen 
1
1 
in the i nt ensive bolohevization of the countries and the 
growing Soviet dominance over them. 
3 . Soviet Influence 
Obviously Poland and Czechoslovakia are in t he process of 
social revolution . This , a s we have analysized, is caused by 
t heir internal social and economic developments l·Jh1ch dated 
from the prewar time and affected by the postwar general trend 
to,ard social and economic changes. This , as ·e have specially 
stressed, i s a fundamental force in de ciding the recent pol iti-
cal developments in b t h countrie s . At the same time, Soviet 
i nfluence is also a factor at least equally significant in 
changing Polish and Czechoslovak political life. 
Soviet influence upon the Polish and Czechoslova~ 
politics throughout the interwar period was l ar gely ne g tive. 
The ne\'1 Soviet system was so abominable to the victorious Great 
Pot'lers that a "Cordon Sanita.ire" 't'J'aS erected round t he Soviet 
Union ' s net..r frontiers , and no attenti on ~v-as pai d t her t-tishes . 
Heanwh1le , the Soviet Union deliberately i solated herself , for 
she profoundly distrusted all capitalist countries , and she 
concentrated her energy on the - immense task of social re-
construct1,on uithin her own state . In Poland, owning to the 
corrupt and brutal social and political system, t he ruling 
I 
7~ . 
class was alwa s afraid of revolution which the attributed not -------=~==========~==========================~====~~~~~======= 
t o th .ir o~ . f~ults ut t o t he machin tion 
agents end gold. As Nazi Germany 1 s t hreat was a r ching , t he 
\·re s tern .. o· ers beg n to sh ow t heir intention to ooo J r te t~ ith 
I the Soviet Union, but thi?. Polish Governm nt still had no 
'I I interest in the gr . d Fl.nti-Naz1 al-lianoe . Eventu lly t he 
Soviet Govern.rnent a o-r.> ted a nel-! olicy t .. · ard r..erm ny nd 
.arti tione the Polish State t·ri th her . 
· u.ring much of the 1920 1 s and 1930 ~ s Czechoslovakia t-J' s 
the core f the Ll ttle r.::n tente . 1:lhen a~gre ssi ve Nazism 
ap.1 eared, he r stat s:nen realizeo. the necessity of military co-
operat1 n ·ri t h the Sovie.t Union and joined the Franc - Soviet 
Pact . But t he ver- all si tnation t-ras so bad t hat German 
Pro!)aga.nda could convince influential people in F.:ast ..... rn and 
i:festern Surope tha t Cz ,choslovakL r..ras d.angerous "center of 
the Bolshevik i nfection, u30 nd finally Czec.hoslovaki t-.ras 
estroyed by Hitler in coll~boration ~1th Nevill e Chamberlain 
and Rl adier . 
During t he a.r, Polish- Sovj.et relations t"lere the most 
troublesom problem among the Allied Powers, mainly because the 
Soviet Union i nsiste on the new frontier along the Curzon line 
the Poli sh Government •;~a s too proud of a pAst • icture to 
at ten tion to the pre sent reali tj.' . On the other hand, 
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union were on good terms with 
each other , since at Munich and thereafter the Soviet Union 
30Hug~ Ge ton-. 1. atson, Eastern Europe Bet~1een the Iars . 
1945, p . 415 . 
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const ntl y gnve spiritual su port to the azechoslov~ k ople . 
After the :ar t1e international scene has beco~e en-
tirely c .nged. It is generally re cogni ze . t h t 
The em r.: -nce of tte Sovie t Union a s t he single 
great power on the continent of Europe does and will 
1 
ne ce ssc_rily e .. ercise a tremendous influence on the social ! 
and economic structure of the neighboring countries, 3~ven ite i nd endently of Soviet designs {nd ambitions . 
Firs t of 11, eland and Czechoslovakia ~ere liberated by 
the l ed Arm in 1944 ... 45 and passed i nto the <3oviet orbit by 
virtue of t he bal ance ot mill t .ary- might !i thin the victorious 
co 11 ti n or a s · r, sul t of the d1plom.ati c greement bet•reen 
the United St ates, an t he Soviet Un1on, 32 and their retention 
td thin the Boviet sp . ere is regarde d by 4osco '~ as 'i..rell a s by 
t hemselve as e ssent i · l for military security and. the fin 1 
realiza tj_on of Sl av un1 ty under 'f..1 oscov1 te leadership . 33 .1.he 
Sovi e t-Polish t reaty of 20-.yenr f'rien _slip 1 mutual a id an co-
oper tion {on ;\~ril 21, 1945) and the Soviet.-. Czechoslovak 
tre at of 20- year alli .nee (on December 12, 1943) are t he basis 
of Soviet-Polish and Soviet-Czecho slovak relations . 
First 1:Jorl "Tar , as me l.1bers of the 11 Cordon San1 taire, 1 the 
3ls arp , .Q.l· c:tt . , p . 11 . 
32Host of Bohemia could have been liberated by the 
American army, had General Patton not been restrained. 
~~ 
uvit is very significant that on November ? , 1 949 the 
Polish Government announced the appointment of Sovie t marshal 
Konstantin K. Rokossovsky as Polish l~inister of Defense and 
~1ar shal of t he Polish armies on the ground that he 't>Tas a Pole 
and was popul ar vli th the Pol:l sh nation . 
I· 
? r, .... . 
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1estern .LUVS did not loo~~ to the ~-:ast but to the \Jes t for 
their cultural and poli·ica.l ties ; but after the Second 1 r ld 
:Jar , tl ey d.re looltJ.ng to the " st for t heir guidance . 
c: ..... cond.ly , t·.e p- tterns of p o st1.11ar soc1ul nd economic 
reforms :i.n PolP.n~ , .nd Czechoalov k ia lar,~ely ir l tate the Sovie t 
m de ls. Fo only ,;~ovi e t ideals ins1 i re the ir l ea ers, but a.lso 
I 
So riet exper:i.ences afford them practica_ me t hods . 
A merJber of he Polish Government, Vice- l in1ster• of 
Justice Leon Ch jn, said : 
l•:e admi t -'-ha. our present political rea.ll ty both i n the 
economic and soc1al sense stands l argely under the in-
f uemce of the Octobel1 ( Huss1an) nevolut1on . "'4 
" .. resi dent Benes in e:::pla.ining the r easons for na:tiona.l-
iz·tion de cl~red : 
r-·- :ts only ne.t ural that i t s Clussia ' s) socialistic system 
should have an i nfluence upon us •• • It is ~·rell kno? n th t 
ide· .l s Ct~nnot be hinderet1 by any l~I"OI':ltiers . m at i s ·yhy 
we are t aking from the Soviet Union all t hat we can use , jus t 1 s ·Je take it from Greo. t Br•1 t ain, America or 
Fr ance . 35 
Soviet influence upon the economic life of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia became more evident since J une 1947. Wh n t he 
Pari s Conference on the ~arshall Pl an was held, Polish and 
Czechoslovak Governments at first stated t hat they would parti-
cipate, because they were desperate ly i n need of American a i d 
and anxious for a renewal of their normal economic ties with 
34sh~o , QQ. cit . , p . 11 . 
35 Ibid. . 
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t e ~; t . But t hw ov i e J Un i n, afte r t h bre c of olot ov's 
d i cCUSSi on d t . Bevin and Bi c a l11 t I de nou oed t_ e e-..rshall 
a s a me a sure t o p r mo te me r1can e. ar ts, a s an t tem t to 
sp li .~ur ope apart , , nd a s Dnothe r ex-::m;_. l e of Am eric i m-
lan 
pe ri l i s rn 1i e t h r uman .octrin t o interfer · i t h t _e i -
er·1al afx .irs of othe r countries . . ~ s 11oscm· decided. to i:' e -
j c t e !:a l'•..., .. a "'..l a i el , 1'iar so.u mel Pr ague's p ossibi 1 ty t o 
a ccep t i t t•r •.. s gone . 3 ~~om: tlJ t he . olish and Czechoslovak 
Gove r 1ents vi l ently attacke t he Pari Confere1c n t h 
g round t h a iJ it 11 uouHl con tribute t o t he r e b i rth f Ge :r•r.1 .. n 1rn -
perialis. 11 ad i 11 1 lies a n im ortant t r~ at t o p e ce .'" 
1 -s counter ction again s t t he Aar shall Pl an, t h 
I "l· l o · ov ?l anH ~ s bec ome equally ~ e ll kn 1·m. It ref r to a 
network f t rad agree ments in t~w Enste rn ~urope a i ming t the 
conomic revival of t e rt of ~": ur pe beh i n t e 11 I on 
without substanti a l a ssi s t a nce fro~ or co~erati on 
u i t .h -.1 es t e r Europe nd Americ • In f act, this t sk st ted 
i mmedla t e ly after t he ¥ra.r . Durlng 1945- 4? t he Soviet Union 
made n ~rou s trade agr eement s \vi th her neighboring states . 
From Pol nd , t !e Soviet Uni on agr ed to take coal, oteel , zin c 
and othv r goods in re turn for co tton and ot er r J materials . 
y t he greement of August 29 , 194? , the -oviet Union remised 
t o su l y Poland ¥r1th 300 , 000 tons of gr ain for t he year . From 
Czechoslov ki , the Soviet Union agr ed to take rollin .. mill 
36Fa y , 11 T. e N'arshall Pl a n, 11 Curren t History. Sep tember 
1947, pp . 131-132. 
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ores, petroleum products and chem1ca.ls.37 On January 25 , 1949 , 
Mosoo1r1 announced a. move to form a "Council of Economic Hutual 
Aidtt to oversee the intricate system of interlocking trade 
· treaties of Eastern Europe. 
The Communists in Poland and Czechoslovakia seem con-
v1nced t hat economic depression in the capitalist countries 
are inevitable, so t hey are willing to gear t heir countries' 
economy to t he needs of t he allegedly depressionless plan ed 
economies of their neighbors. It is because of this evaluation 
that in Czechoslovakia emphasis is placed on the production and 
export of heavy capital goods, required tor the industrializa-
tion of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, 
r a t her ·than on the production and export of consumer goods, 
which will facilita.te expansion of trade with Western European 
and overse as oountries.38 
Above all; t he most effective Soviet in:f'luenee upon the 
political deve lopment s of Poland and Czechoslovakia is the 
rigid enforcement of party control.. No doubt Communist Parties 
all over t he world have the common ideology of the Marxist .. 
Leninist principle and look to the Communist Party of the 
37Fay, "Trade . Policies Behind the Iron Curtain, 11 Current 
History. December 1947, p . 324. 
38Ph111p rr: . Mosely, "Czechoslovakia., Poland, Yugoslavia., 
Observations a.nd reflections," Political Science quarterly. 
March 1948, p . 2. · 
Soviet Union as the leader of world revolution . 39 Owing to 
geographic proximity, the Polish and Czechoslovak Communists 
are closely tied to the Soviet Communists . Boleslaw Bierut, 
t he leader of the Polish Communists, and Klement Gottwald, the 
leador of the Czechoslovak Communists, both spent their iar 
years in t he Soviet Union and returned to their homeland pre-
ceeding or accompanying the Red Army . 
The Marshall l'lanaiming at European economic recovery , 
has contained the Communist expansion. It not only consider-
ably "t~eakened the Communist influence in ~festern European 
countries , but also sometofha t endangered the ' ~Jew Democratic" 
Governments in Eastern Europe , including the coalitions of 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, where existed certain amount of 
opposition or luke-1.:armness to the Commun1st-.cl.om1nated regimes. 
II 
I 
Under t hese circumstances, the Communists had to seek 
me ans to strengthen themselves in order to change the balance 
of power . At the end of September 1947, two delegates from 
each Communist parties of nine European countries met in Poland 
under the guidance of Zhdanov and J-1alenkov , deputies of the 
Communist Party of the .Soviet Union . The Communists of Poland 
were represented by Wladyslaw Gomulka and Hilary Mine and those 
of Czechoslovakia by Rudolf Slansky and s. Bashtovansky . They 
resolved to establish the Cominform (the Info~mation Bureau . 
39The recent deviation of Yugoslav Communists is the 
only but very significant exception. 
79 . 
of the Communis t and 1.iforkers 1 Parties) with the purpose of 
exchanging experiences and , in case of necessity, coordinating 
the activities of Communist parties on foundations of Soviet 
guidance . The Cominform is not exactly a revival of the 
Comintern but has been generally regarded as a quaa1-
Comintern . 40 
The emergence of the Cominform · sharpened still further 
the division of Europe bett-teen East and \'lest "t·Thich had already 
been deepened by the }1arshall and Holotov Plans . In Poland and 
Czechoslovakia as t'lell as in other Eastern European countries, 
politi cal parties in opposition to the Communists and left-
wing Socialist s were more and more anxious to preserve , as 
as they could, their links 't..ri th the \lest and to resist the 
revolutionary policies of the Government s by appealing to 
long I 
nationalist sentiments; and the · Communists tte re more and more 
determined to eliminate the Opposition as effectively as 
possible on the one hand and to consolidate their collaboration 
with t he lett-wing Social ists by whatever means on the other . 
These violent struggles culminated in the Czechoslovak crisis 
of February 1948 and the fusion of the Socialist and Communist 
parties of Poland and Czechoslovakia in the second half of the 
same year. 
?he main aim of the Cominform 1 si to strengthen t he 
. 40see Fay , 11 The Cominform," Current His tor:z:. J anuary 
1948 ; and M. s. andler, "The Cominform, Instrument of the 
Kremlin, 11 Nel'i Yor k Times r-1agazine . October 1949 • 
. ; 
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Communist international coordination and to bring about a 
concentration of potrer in ·the hands of a highl y di scipl ine d 
gr oup , purged of "~,rave ring and opportuni s tic elements. " The 
1 wavering and oppor tunistic elernenta" within the communist 
parties in Easte rn ;,u i•opean countries '!.'\Tere marked by the color 
of na t ionalism . Thus , · 
and , 
There were Polish communists who managed t o combine 
their communist creed with a traditional national nride 
or even a f eeling of a p articular miss1on . 41 · 
There were Czech commun i st s t"ii'ho admitted t ha.t t he 
revolution of 1917 had t aken place "in the wrong country" 
an _ that they coul d produce a more civilized version , 
because of their technical and cultural superiority over 
a nat ion of muzhike .42 · 
So the Ti to episode which revealed in t he second confer-
ence of t he Cominform i n June 1948 had immedlate r e1 ercuss ions 
in Poland and Cze choslovakia.. In Poland,. in September 1948 
Wladyslaw Gomulka ~ra.s dismissed from his poet of the Secretary-
1 
General of t he Horkera • Party~ when he had to accept the 
party's denuncia tion of his error of "right--vring and national-
istic deviation ; ~~ and. soon afterwards all t hose follov.r1ng t he 
same line of thinki ng or action were purged. In Czechoslovakia 
1 
a purge of ·the Communist ~ arty st arted in the summer of 1948 an 
I within a year 250 , 000 me mbers had been expelled or demoted to 
I 
4lshar . , "Recent Pol1 tical Trends 1.n the New 
American Perspective. !<1 a.roh 1949, p . 506. Demooracle s, ! 
42Ib i d -~ I 
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candidate status;43 and on March 41 1949 the Centr al Committee 1 
announced that the admission of ne ·r members to the party would 
be halted in order to devot e all efforts to raising the id 
gical level of the present members . 44 
lo-J 
I 
In November 1949, the Cominform hel its third meeting, 
in -y, hich 1 t denounced . unreservedly the 1arsha 11 Plan, the North 
Atlantic Pact and other nti-Communist measures of the nglo-
American bloc an j once more called f or struggles against t he 
right ... wing socialists as wel as the Ti to clique t1b.Om it con-
demned as 11 tools of \·Tes tern imperialists and enemies of peace .' 
1 
Jo doubt , the purges in Poland. and Czechoslovakia since 
the end of September 1947 have been inseparable from the over-
all tactics of the Cominform l-rhich, 1n turn, i s mainly con-
trolled by t he Communist Party of the Soviet Union . 
4 . 11 Ne,, Democra cytt 
Social revolution and Sm.riet influence are the t1-1 prin-
cipal f ac tors in transforming Pol an(l anCl. Czechoslovakia from a 
p seudo democratic or a liberal democratic country into "net 
democratic" sta tes . Fundamenta lly u r~ew Democraoy 11 is a concept 
l'Ihich was developed in oonformi ty with the advancement or 
43The Christ i an Science Monitor . Febru ry 18, 1950 . 
44current Histor l . May 1949, p . 305 • 
.1. -~0The communique of the conference ~ras publ1 shed in the 
Net-t York TiiJe s , November 30 1 1949 . 
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I 
soci al revolution and t he enhancement of Soviet influence. 
11 Nettr Democracy" in the first pos t -vmr period as a clevioe 
of the Communists used t o facilitate internal consolidation and 
international recognition. It "t..ras designed t o create t he 
i mpression of peaceful cooperation of Communists and non-
Communists for t he realization of a triple-decker economy which 
included socialized, cooperative and private f actors . It seeme 
to be a synthesis of the extremes of cap italism and communism . 
Accordingly, i n 1945-194'7, the Gove.rnment of National 
Unity t<Ias established in :Poland and the Government of the 
National Fr ont was formed in Czechoslovaki a . In each country , 
while t he rightist parties were proscribed , the coalitions led 
by the Left were at first fairly authent1o.46 
But as progr am s of Social revolution <Ie re carried out , 
t he old uell ... to-do cla sses bege.n to show t hat they t-Iould never 
accept t he new social order so long . as t hey retained any power 
t o wor k ugainst it, i n the open or underground, and it Jas very 
na tural that 
t he supporters of the proscribed partie s flocke d i nto 
whatever parties were still permitted and were most 1n 
opposition to the forces of socialism and communi sm. •? 
:F'rom this angl e we may understand t he changing standpoints of 
the Poli sh ... easant Party i n Poland and the ~ational Soctalist 
I· 
II 
. . . . . I 
46
sharp , "Recent Trends in t he Ne"t-T De-mocracies," American 
PerF.mective~ Ma rch 1949 , p . 502. 
47G-. D. H. Cole, \ilorld ·in 'l'ransitlon., 1949, p . 230 . 
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Part y in Czechoslovaki a . 
he oviet Union wae not willing t o permi t t he reemergenc 
of Anti- Communist force s . By her ighty force a.n'~ revolution-
ary ideal and ou-ing to t he Yalta and Pot sdam. agreements she had 
gained the act ual l eading posit ion in Eastern Europe and un-
doubtedly Bhe wanted her neighboring countries to be sociali zed ! 
as soon and a.s t horoughly a s possibl e . 11hen t he interne.tional 
situat i on deteriorated , the . ov1et Union g ,_ve even more support 
t o these regimes , realiz1ng that those i n opposition to t hem 
were he l ped and en.couraged by t he \'!estern l'ol!Ters . 
I n such circumstance s, poli tical struggl es ~vi thin the 
coalit i ons \vere aggrava ted . Despite the solemn promise of 
"free and unfe ttered elections , " elections i n postwar Poland 
and Czechoslovakia r.N'e r e never permi tted to be free , :n the 
sense in uhich elections in t he Unite St ates and Great Britain 
are free , simply because t here w s a Communist-led revolution. I 
Furthermore, fearing that t heir enemy ' s reeking t ac tics 
\vill molte it irn./ossible for the netv order t o succeed 1n 1 ts 
r evolutionary measures , t hose who stood f or t ~e ne vr social 
system ac·ainst the old had no alternntive . They had to root 
out the pouer of the old privileged classes so t horoughly a s to 
render t helr counterrevolu 'Gionary hopes impotent . 48 For this 
purpose or by this jus tification t he new regime s in ~eland and 
Czechosl v~k1a used every r ut hless means . First, t hey seized 
48~. , p . 233 . 
84 . 
t he levels OJ. pol.Yer 1 the Hini stry of I nterior and t he ?Uni s try 
of .Justice 1 u ,..,in3 t 10 former t o p c .t \'lith their su p<.')rters the 
police f o!'ce 11 general and the secret olio 1n particular 
and t he l a tter to force judges to interpret t he l a r to the 
a vantage of Comrr:.urii st . olicy . Secondly , t hey ne netr ted t he 
army , infiltr a t ing their members or agents especially i nto the 
General .. s ·aff , hugh the linister of Defense mi ght be a non-
party .<-11 norni nally. Thirdly , they controlled the pre s s and 
the r adi o , m.":'!.king them offic:te.l me tans of propaganda . .."'ourthly , 
th y cre ~te or took over influential masa org ni zation~ , 
mobili z i ng 11 t ha broad ... Jopul r masses" behind the "revolutionary 
va.nga.rd . " ll t hee re~ ressive means together mc.de more pr o-
found t e "~:le stern Horld' s hatred of the communist rev lut io 
r ic_1 uas detriment a l t o their interests and. a.v ~se t o the ir 
tradition . 
Th period nfter t he pr oclamation of t he 1arsha11 Pl 
t-m s ifferent frorn the 1mmed:L ~. te post\iJ'ar period . Socia revo-
l ution an<l ;-3ov i e t 1nflu~noe i n Pol nd And Cze c~1oslov 1a ,s 
1ell as in other ,astern Europe an countries bec a.m mo~e 11-
t ns ive and consequently by n ·.ce sn1 ty t he very phi oso y f 
11 Neu D,mocracy" uas reformul ~ ted . 
Before the fift h Bulgari an Communi st Congress on December 
25 , 1948 , eorg i Dimitrov; the late old Com1.ntern leader, m de 
a speech on 11 Ne 't1 Democraoy,tt 49 declaring tha t 11 t he Pe ople ' s 
49 1D1mitrov on Communist Stra tegy , '' Economist. J an. 5, 
1949 . 
5 . 
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Democracy is a democracy completely different from and strongly 
ant agonistic to the 'fl'estern demoeraoyi' and that it is "the 
dictatorship of proletariat" in a. "new form." 
According to the r4arxi st-Lenini st prinoi le ~ the 
Soviet system of government and the system of gover nment 
in the countries with People's Democracy are two forms of 
one po ~er -- the pot-rer of the 't-torking class in alliance 
with and in leadership of the toiling peasants . They are 
both alternative forms of t he dictatorship of the 
proletariat. 
Soviet experienoe is the only and t he best nattern 
for the building of socialism in our country as well as 
in other countries of People's Democracy. 
Dimi trov reiterated the Communist dogma that the dictator-
ship of the proletariat is the purest and the broadest form of 
real socialist democracy because it is a dictatorship in the 
in tereS t of t he gre a.t m aj ori ty of the \ITOrk ing people. Accord-
i ng to his new· interpretation, the transformation from capital-
ism to socialism in the 11 New Democratic" countries is going to 
be achieved without the need for the establishment of a system 
of Soviet government , while the leading position of the 
communist party must be strengthened in all fields of political 
economic and cultural life and in all activities of t he state 
against all internal and external enemies. He specially 
emphasized : 
All communists should realize the importance of the 
full coordination of the activities of all communist 
parties 1n the vorld under the leadership of the Soviet 
Communist Party. All communist parties have one common 
policy and acknowledge the great Soviet Communist Party 
as the leading party of the international labor movement . 
\ Dimitrov 's speech contained an interesting and 1m ortant 
II disclosure that St alin had offered •personal advice and 
II 
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'' New Democracy" a s a dynamic concep t reflecting partly the 
Pr actice of Civil Liberties 
i 
j In observing post,I!Tar poll tical developments in Poland and 
11 Czechoslovakia. in terms of the dynamism of 11 New Democra cy" 
I N'hich has always been the mixture of social revolution and 
I Soviet influence; it must be noticed that 11 Ne'\'l Democra cy" ha.s 
i completely rooted out t he lfeetern eonoepts and praotioe of o1v1ll 
I liberties which did exist in Czechoslovaki a. t hough never firmly 
/ i mplanted in Poland. 
In order to seize power and to strengthen it , the 
I Communists have used ><hatever means they like . A relentless I 
II change i n poli tioal and economic 1nst1 tutions in each of the I 
two countries we have already discussed ~ Now let us go a step 
further to look at the me rciless destruction of their civil 
\ libertie s which; be ing especially closely related to the life 
1
1 and t hinking of t he middle- cla ss people, have naturally been 
II 
II 
'I 
II 
I 
I 
87 . 
1\ most p rofoundly felt by them . I 
Just as the bitter political struggle emerged earlier in 
Poland than in Czechoslovakia , so did the change of social 
institutions come first to Poland and later to Czechoslovakia. 
As f a r as Poland is .concerned, Jl.1ikolajczyk' s book and 
other reports give us the follot,.ring f acts: 
1) The loss of free education. During 1947 the Communist 
made all youth organizations i nto one Communist youth movement . 
Any student who refused to join it 10uld be expelled from their 
schools by the Special Commission for Discipline . 1\11 boys and 
girls were similarly trained for 11 Service to the Country . " All 
students received the communist new education . A high school 
student wishing to continue his study must pass a test · of 
poll tical knowledge sponsored by the l-11niatry of Education . 
And all universities were controlled by the government too . 50 
2) The loss of t he freedom of press . Purges of the 
personnel of the Polish press during the past three years have 
culminated in the recent resolution of tho Journalist Union 
providing that only those who are working for the government 
press can be regarded as qualified journalists . It is repor ted I 
that some 3 , 000 Polish newspaper men \'fill be barred from I 
practicing their profession. 5l 
50t-i1kolajczyk, The Rape of Poland . 1948, pp .. 225- 226 . 
51The Christian Science Monitor . March 141 1950 
I 
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I 
,, 
3) The destruction of free culture . Ac cording to 
II 
I 
I 
! 
l1 .1kolajczyk, by t he end of 1947 the government introduced arsh 
1
1 
licensing into all professional, technological, and artist ic il 
fi elds . I 
A teacher QOUlcl not fine_ employment unless appointed I 
af ter a series of ''loyal ty'·1· tests . Actors, for instance, 
1
1 
could ·mrk only for state ..... ot<med . theaters or film 1 
companies . Journalists must as sure the state of their 
loyalty before being accepted for positions on ne rspapers l 
Novels ~d special articles mus t be submitted for censor- ( 
ship . 1Jri ters must also a peal to the government for 
paper . 52 I 
I, Because more ,
1 t han 90% of the people of Pol and are Catholic and the Church 1 
4) The lose of the treedom of religion. 
li has pl ayed a le ding role in the life of the land, the 1 
Communists • anti-clerical measures must be especially signifi- I 
cant . Since 1945, Catholic periodicals and astoral letters I 
have been censored. In June 1949 the government took over the 1 
largest Catholic printing office under the term of t he nation-
1
1 
aliz.at1on lal'r of 1 946 . Thie was followed by a violent mutual 1j 
attack bett11een t he Pope and the Polish government and temporary I 
agreement was not reached until September . 53 
5) The crushing of personal liberty. Und.er t he new 
regime, those people discredited by the go"'ternment were 
constantly accused of 11 spreading f alse rumors,'' arrested by t he 
52Mikolaj.czyk , .2!2.· cit., p . 219. 
53 curz:ent Developments in the United States Foreign 
Policies. r<! ay .... June 1949 , P • 48; July-August 1949 , p . 51; 
September 1949, p . 32 . 
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secret police, tried in the mili t ary courts, prosecuted in the 
j ail s and finally sen t enced af te r they had b en force to ma.k.e 
11 confe ssions 11 in public. 54 
In Czechoslovakia, t he complete destruction of civil 
libert.ie s carne ti t h th coup of February 1948. However, before 
this , the rigid limitation of fre e expression had already got 
unde r way. At the end of 1946 several publications attem ted to 
unleash an anti-Soviet propa.ganda 1-rhi ch the government di d not 
like; t hen in the summer of 1947 the National As sembly passed a 
comprehensive pre ss bill, actually requiring all regular ne a-
paper staffs to be members of t he tightly controlled journa-
lists' unions v.rh1ch t·rould have t he pO"toTer to expel any member 
from t he profession. Since then, the government has monopolize 
t he press and rad:to and ha s silenced all organs of oppos1tion . 5 
Immediately after the coup of February 1948, t he 
Communists took over the Bar Association and took char ge of the 
tightly organized Union of Czechoslovak Youth . In September 
the government announced a new internal security law which 
provided that any attempts to prevent the authorities of the 
state from performing their duties, even 1f force is not used, 
and any contact '\tith a foreign po qer or i ndividual for that 
purpose would be considered high treason . In December the 
54 Mikolajczyk, ~· cit., pp . 23A- 238 . 
55 And.re't-1 Gyorgy, Governments _of Danubian f<!urope ~ 1949, 
pp . 86-88. 
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~ government went further to approve a measure reforming the 
i courts nd legal proced.ures i n such a manner that nationals 
I seeking leeal advice would not select their own council but 
---rr 
I 
I 
I 
, vrou.ld apply to a l awyer.s' union and be assigned an attorney 
selecte according to the kind of ca se involvea. 56· 
II 
Throu hou t 1949 the st tEJ an t +1e Church fought against 11 
each otl'l.er . Oh~rging that certa i n .huroh i gnitari es head d by II 
rchbish op Beran t-rere trying t o use Church institutions in co- I 
operation with the enemies of t he republic abroad to abuse the 
1
1 
republic, the government~sponsored Catholic Action committees 
I ruled the priests toJi th an iron hand in Slovakia and occupied 
the offices of the Archbishop's palace in J rague . 57 
In October 1949 the Communists deol· red vrar a<.;) inst the 
mi ddle class . Several t 1ousands of «social parasites' such as 
lawyers, s mall businessmen , and other professio11a.l :p eople \fere 
elimin·· ted and placed i nto labor camps ~.;hei'e they had to per-
form 11 soclal§ruseful Norkn for the state . 58 
.At t he present stage, the d;ri ve against t he middl e class 
II 
li 
is bein6 ex tended to the 11 rich" peasants i n the country. A 
"p roletarian i ntellige ntrl. a." is being formed t o replace the. old 11 
Ill intellectuals . Czeehos1ovakia •s history i being rewritten 1n 
56current Developments in Uni ted St ates Foreign Policy;. 
September 1 48, p . 32; December 1948, p . 26 . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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II 
57Ibid . 1 May- une 1949, p . 45-46; July-August 1949, p . 1/ 
II 56The Christian Science Monitor. February 21, 195~~ L 
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ter~s of ~arxist-Leninist princ1p les.59 
A sp y scare i s headlined i n Czechoslov k'1a. ,just a s in 
other E stern Wuropea n countries. Si nce t he la.et year, more 
t ha_ 100 erson s have been sentence d to long prison terms and 
severa l r ere e xecuted for allege d espionage for tb.e tJestern 
p owers . 'l'hanks to t he Communist cteep-sea te tl distrust Of t he 
oapi tali st countries,. it has become . extremely difficult for 
fo re i gn tourists t o a. pl y for visas, and t the same time 
every Czech mailing letter 
self . 60 
broad ie require to i .entity h im-
This terrible picture shows that 11 l\!ew Democr cy 11 as an 
e xpression of 11 proletari an dicta torshi p " is indeed , relentless 
process of social revolut,_on in the sense of Soviet Communism. 
It is pre cisely because of t he Communist rule t hat !3Uch 1Te otern 
1
1 
concept s and pr a ctice as c:t v11 liberty, inc1i vidual fr edom and 
legal righ ts have disap e ar ed from Pol and and Cze c oslova.~ia. . 
all a t once . And it is precisely beca use of t hese changes t hat ! 
the 111e s·tern pm,rers have teno.ed to discre dit t he ne,., regimes 
without reserve , thereby often disregarding t he ir positive 
a chievements i n economic reforms. 
591.verth, 11 Czechoslovaki a Revisited', 11 Nation. January 
1950 . 
14, I 
I 
60The Christian Science Moni t_o_r_. _ F_ebruary 18, 1950 . 
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CDr1PRF.!1F.:N SI VE ABSTRACT 
Poland and Czechoslovaki a are t wo of the most i mportant 
countries i n ?.a stern Europe . Their politica l developments 
since t he end of t he First Horld tvar bear many remarkable 
par allels. 
The i ntert..rar period l-Ia s trying years for them both. 
I Polish Government was in the hands of a feudal~oaoitalist-
i military class whose records were greedy, corrup t and brutal, 
and t here was no democracy nor reform except on paper . Con-
sequently, social discontent gre'" among the people, especially 
among t he working cla ss and the poor pea santry . In Czecho-
slovakia~ t hanks to t he compar atively balanced economy and the 
libera l tradition, democratic system was preserved till t he 
end . The personality of Masaryk wa s entirely different from 
t hat of Pilsudski. Nevertheless, the Agrarian Party t.;hich 
pl ayed t he leading role in vari ous coali tiona t-ra s principally a 
party of t he we althy people and paid little attention t o the 
demand of the unskilled industrial l aborers and the Slovak and 
Ruthenian small holders . 
!·1inori ty problems in Poland and Czechoslovakia, inherent-
ly troublesome and aggr avated by the world Depression, soon 
became an exouse for foreign invasion~ As t he danger of Nazi-
Germany was approaching , t he VIe stern Powers • policy of a.ppease-1 
men ·t helped Hitler to crush t he Czechoslovak i ndependence and 
in the same manner t he Soviet Policy of Realpolitik assisted 
i. 
'I 
II 
Hitler to dissolve the Polish State. 
The old order of Pol and and Czechoslovakia has been 
destroyed by the Second •:rorld trfar . 'l'heir liberation from azi-
Germany's occupation by the Soviet Union must be an important 
i mpetus for ·their social change s which, according to many 
observers, even constitute evidences for Soviet domination . 
As a result of posttiar struggles bet~.;een the ·rest and the , 
East, Poland and Czechoslovakia fall inevitably in t he Soviet 
orbit . They are militarily, politically and economically interL 
locked tii t h the Soviet Union e.nd other Eastern European 
countries. 
Their "New Democratic" Governments, coalition in form , 
coming i n to being through complica ted step s of conflicts and 
compromises and claiming to represent the interests of t he 
grea.t majority of the pe ople, are controlled by the Communist s 
who in the interwar pe riod were either illegal or constantly 
I 
of Nazi-Germany•s l excluded from off1oe and t-Tho during the years 
occupation either persisted. as an underground fighting force I 
or went to t he Soviet union for revolutionary training. 
The Communists held elections t hrough mass agitation and 
the single list of candi dates. They used ruthless means in 
dealing \'Ti th their 11 class enemies 11 : t hey first proscribed the 
right-wi ng parties, then annexed the Soeialists and finally 
purged " the opportunistic and 't·tavering elements'• wit:hm their 
own parties . The Tito ep isode has had repercussions i n eland 
and Czechoslovaki a , and struggles against the cha\lVinist 
ii. 
========~============================~~======================~===----
1
1 
deviation there a: e the most str11t1ng poll tical events no • 
I 
'' Nevi Democracy, 11 being a dyne.mic concept, is proclaimed at the 
present stage as a form of t he diotatorshipof t he proletari at. 
I t is closely af f iliated with the Soviet system and strongly 
antagoni stic to the t1estern democracy. 
The Communists are highly disciplined, full of revolu-
tionary enthusiasm and unusual ly efficient in doing the immense 
tork of postwar reconstruction . Land est tea have been 
divided up ; key i ndustries have been national iz,ed; oooperat1 vee 
have been incre ased ; pl anned economy of short-term recovery 
and long-term social reform have been l aunched. Consequently 
living con itions of the orking class have been gradu lly 1m-
proved and rural unemployment has begun to reduce . 
As Ec_stern European countries, Poland and Czechoslovaki a 
internally are in t he flood of social revolution and i nter-
nationally are sa tellites of t he Soviet Union . These t o inter 
mingled f orces are t he basic f actors underlying their recent 
political developments . 
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